カンボジアとラオスにおける雇用の成長と不就学児童：家計、中等学校生、教師の意思決定に関する実証分析 by Viriyasack SISOUPHANTHONG
Kobe University Repository : Thesis
学位論文題目
Tit le
Employment growth and out-of-school children in
Cambodia and Laos: An empirical study on decision
making of households, secondary educat ion students,
and teachers.(カンボジアとラオスにおける雇用の成長
と不就学児童：家計、中等学校生、教師の意思決定に関
する実証分析)
氏名
Author Viriyasack SISOUPHANTHONG
専攻分野
Degree 博士（経済学）
学位授与の日付
Date of Degree 2016-03-25
公開日
Date of Publicat ion 2017-03-01
資源タイプ
Resource Type Thesis or Dissertat ion / 学位論文
報告番号
Report  Number 甲第6549号
権利
Rights
URL http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/handle_kernel/D1006549
※当コンテンツは神戸大学の学術成果です。無断複製・不正使用等を禁じます。
著作権法で認められている範囲内で、適切にご利用ください。
Create Date: 2017-12-18
i 
 
 
10 November 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employment growth and out-of-school children in Cambodia and  
 
Laos: An empirical study on decision making of  
 
households, secondary education students, and teachers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Faculty:    Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies 
 
 
Department:    Economic Development and Policies 
 
 
Academic Advisor:   Professor Terukazu SURUGA 
 
 
Student ID:    113i502i 
 
 
Name:    Viriyasack SISOUPHANTHONG 
  
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my family 
i 
 
Executive summary 
Education is a vital determinant for economic development, especially in 
developing countries. It improves labor productivity and increases economic growth. 
Therefore, governments and development organizations have focused on educational 
development that in results high school enrollment worldwide. However, the number 
of out-of-school children remains high. Dropping out of school before the end of 
compulsory education or leaving school early can become a major problem. School 
dropout can be the strongest factor impacting on future social and economic status of 
children. Dropout from school limits choice and opportunity for employment. 
Students who do not graduate have a higher likelihood of being unemployed and earn 
less when they are employed. Furthermore, dropped out students are also likely to 
have difficulty receiving public assistance, in health problems, and may lead to 
criminal behavior and incarceration. In developing countries, if children from poor 
socio-economic backgrounds are out of school, they have difficulty improving their 
living standard and continue to live in poverty. Thus, it exacerbates cycle of the 
poverty when the poor lose an opportunity to be educated. 
Several studies have found factors that influence school dropout and non-
enrollment. One important factor that directly and indirectly increases the number of 
out-of-school children is growth in employment demand. Generally, growth improves 
wage levels and expands employment opportunities which help households to 
increase educational resources. However, there is a contrasting effect that increases 
the number of out-of-school children. When there are more jobs and higher wage 
levels in the labor market, the attitude of the main educational agents, specifically 
households, students, and teachers, is effected. 
When there are higher paid jobs and more jobs available, the opportunity cost 
for not working becomes higher and children may drop out from school to take the 
available jobs as additional source of income. Moreover, some children might need to 
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work in the household to substitute for adults who take the available jobs. Regardless 
of whether this is household or child decision, it increases number of out-of-school 
children. 
 The growth of employment attracts potential teachers to take non-teaching 
jobs. The teaching profession in developing countries suffers from low salaries 
compared to average non-teaching salaries in the labor market. Therefore, when there 
are many jobs available with higher pay compared to teaching, potential teachers may 
decide not to join the teaching profession particularly where they need to teach in 
schools with difficult working environments such as rural locations. Where there are 
insufficient qualified teachers in a school, there is a probability that pupils would have 
no education service and would need to be out of school. 
Cambodia and Laos have high economic growth; however, both countries 
have a high number of out-of-school children and school dropouts compared to East 
Asia and Pacific countries. In 2011/12, the dropout rates for primary, lower secondary, 
and upper secondary were 3.7, 20.0, and 10.1 in Cambodia and 7.1, 10.4, and 7.2, in 
Laos, respectively. 
The main objective of this study is to estimate the potential impact of the 
growth of employment on the out-of-school problem. The specific objectives are: (1) 
to estimate the impact of employment growth on out-of-school children, (2) to analyze 
secondary students’ preference on jobs’ characteristics, (3) to examine the possibility 
of potential teachers not joining the teaching profession. Many previous studies 
focused on the impact of employment growth on child labor. The significance of this 
study is that it investigates the impact of the growth on out-of-school children in 
developing countries like Cambodia and Laos. Also this study distinguishes the effect 
of growth on different genders and ethnicities. Moreover, many studies estimate the 
effect of the characteristics of jobs on students who have already dropped out from 
school. This kind of data hinders an analysis of the characteristics of jobs on every 
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student; because some students may have access to different information about the 
jobs available. This study applies choice experiment to measure value characteristics 
of those jobs preferred by secondary students. In valuing the incentives for recruiting 
potential teachers, this research is a pioneer in applying the choice experiment analysis 
to measure the characteristics of difficulties facing the teaching profession, the 
possibility of moving to non-teaching jobs, and non-direct monetary incentives. 
 The main findings of this study shows that, firstly, the effect of the growth of 
un-skilled labor demand on out-of-school suggest that the expansion of agricultural 
and service sectors increase number of out-of-school children. The effect of the 
sectors between male and female children is similar, while the effect between major 
ethnicity and non-major ethnicity children is different in each country. Secondly, the 
results from the experiment of secondary school students show that an increasing 
wage increases the possibility of the students to drop out and take the offered jobs. 
The students are less likely to take the jobs if the location is farther. Also, the students 
who have a higher probability to take the jobs are non-Lao ethnicity students, come 
from poor household, have friends working outside of the residential district, and have 
a difficulty travel to school. Thirdly, the potential teachers are less likely to take the 
teaching profession if they are assign to teach in school that locates in rural village 
without several support infrastructures and has poor condition of classroom. The 
potential teachers prefer the teaching profession over the non-teaching jobs such as 
the government staff, state-enterprise employee, and private company employee. 
However, the preference of the non-teaching jobs easily exceeds the preference of the 
teaching job if the potential teachers need to teach in difficult situation. 
This research provides policy implications for educational development. 
Firstly, children have a possibility to be out of school for working; thus,  
the government should be considered strengthen the regulations to prevent the use of 
child labor that causes them to be out of school, particularly compulsory education. 
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Secondary, households should be educated about the important of the basic education 
and the risk to be out of school because of working. Thirdly, the particular programs 
to motivate school enrollment as well as keeping students in school should be 
considered where there is a high risk for children to be out of school. Also, different 
characteristics of students influence the decision of dropping out. The programs 
should be targeted to the particular problem for an effective policy. Fourthly, the 
difficulty in teaching profession such as the rural location of school and the condition 
of classroom lowers the preference of potential teachers to join teaching profession; 
therefore, teachers in the particular location should be provided incentive programs. 
A particular difficulty in teaching profession should be addressed by a particular and 
appropriate incentive value. Finally, the government should be concerned using the 
indirect monetary incentives. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background of the study 
 
Education is acknowledged as a vital factor that determines economic 
development, especially in developing countries. It helps to improve labor 
productivity and consequently increases economic growth. Therefore, governments 
and development organizations around the world have focused on educational 
development that in results high school enrollment worldwide. However, the number 
of out-of-school children remains high. Many children drop out from school or have 
never enrolled in school. The Global Education Digest 2012 reports that about 131 
million children of primary and lower secondary school age were recently out of 
school (UIS, 2012). Of this number, 26 percent were students who dropped out of 
school. In addition, the number of students who leave primary school before reaching 
the final grade increased from 28.9 million in 2000 to 31.2 million in 2010. This means 
the dropout rate up to final grade of primary education grew from 22.1 percent (1999 
to 2000) to 23.2 percent (2009 to 2010).  
Dropping out of school before the end of compulsory education or leaving 
school early can become a major problem. School dropout can be the strongest factor 
impacting on future social and economic status of children (Jencks et al., 1972; 
Winship and Korenman, 1999). Dropout from school limits choice and opportunity 
for employment. Students who do not graduate have a higher likelihood of being 
unemployed (Sum et al., 2009) and earn less when they are employed (Levin et 
al.,2007). Leaving school before the 12 grade (compulsory education) results in 
poorer outcomes in the labor market (Rumberger, 1987). In addition, Bjerk (2012) 
shows that dropout to work and look after family does not worsen earnings until the 
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individuals are in their twenties. Furthermore, dropped out students are also likely to 
have difficulty receiving public assistance (Waldfogel et al., 2007), in health problems 
(Muennig, 2007), and may lead to criminal behavior and incarceration (Moretti, 2007). 
In developing countries, education can help poor households to get out of 
poverty. If children from poor socio-economic backgrounds are out of school, they 
have difficulty improving their living standard and continue to live in poverty. Thus, 
it exacerbates cycle of the poverty when the poor lose an opportunity to be educated. 
Several studies have found factors that influence school dropout and non-
enrollment. The factors that effect school dropout can be clustered into the push and 
the pull factors (Bjerk, 2012). The push factors are reasons such no education service 
available, distance to school, low performance in class, dislike of school or study, 
moving place of residence, health problems, etc. While the pull factors are 
employment for additional income and/or household work, etc. 
One important factor that directly and indirectly increases the number of out-
of-school children is growth in employment demand. Generally, growth improves 
wage levels and expands employment opportunities which help households to 
increase educational resources. However, there is a contrasting effect that increases 
the number of out-of-school children. When there are more jobs and higher wage 
levels in the labor market, the attitude of the main educational agents, specifically 
households, students, and teachers, is effected. 
Figure 1.1 shows the link between the growth of employment and the out-of-
school problem. When there are higher paid jobs and more jobs available, the 
opportunity cost for not working becomes higher and children may drop out from 
school to take the available jobs as additional source of income. Moreover, some 
children might need to work in the household to substitute for adults who take the 
available jobs. Regardless of whether this is household or child decision, it increases 
number of out-of-school children. 
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 In addition, the growth of employment attracts potential teachers to take non-
teaching jobs. The teaching profession in developing countries suffers from low 
salaries compared to average non-teaching salaries in the labor market. Therefore, 
when there are many jobs available with higher pay compared to teaching, potential 
teachers may decide not to join the teaching profession particularly where they need 
to teach in schools with difficult working environments such as rural locations. Where 
there are insufficient qualified teachers in a school, there is a probability that pupils 
would have no education service and would need to be out of school. 
 
Figure 1.1. – Link of Growth of Employment on Educational Agents’ Decision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Cambodia and Laos have high economic growth. In 2013, the gross domestic 
product (GDP) grew about 7 percent in Cambodia and about 9 percent in Laos. 
However, both countries have a high number of school dropouts compared to East 
Asia and Pacific countries (UIS, 2012). In 2011/12, the dropout rates for primary, 
lower secondary, and upper secondary were 3.7, 20.0, and 10.1 in Cambodia and 7.1, 
10.4, and 7.2, in Laos, respectively. 
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1.2. Objectives 
 
The main objective of this study is to estimate the potential impact of the 
growth of employment on the out-of-school problem. The specific objectives are: 
 
A. To estimate the impact of employment growth on out-of-school children 
A.1.  To analyze the effect of employment growth on school dropout 
A.2.  To estimate the effect of employment growth on non-enrollment in 
school 
A.3.  To distinguish the effect between different genders and ethnicities 
 
B. To analyze secondary students’ preference on jobs’ characteristics 
B.1.  To investigate the impact of increasing wages on the probability of 
secondary students to dropping out of school and taking jobs 
B.2.  To analyze the preference of secondary students by the type and 
location of jobs 
B.3.  To identify the characteristics of secondary students who are likely to 
drop out of school and take jobs 
 
C. To examine the possibility of potential teachers not joining the teaching 
profession 
C.1.  To measure the preferences of potential teachers in regards to rural 
location and conditions of classrooms 
C.2.  To estimate the preference of potential teachers for non-teaching jobs 
C.3.  To measure the preference of potential teachers for indirect monetary 
incentive programs 
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C.4.  To distinguish the above measurements by characteristics of potential 
teachers 
C.5.  To observe the possibility of potential teachers not joining the teaching 
profession 
 
1.3. Significance of the study 
 
Many previous studies focused on the impact of employment growth on child 
labor. The significance of this study is that it investigates the impact of the growth on 
out-of-school children in developing countries like Cambodia and Laos. Also this 
study distinguishes the effect of growth on different genders and ethnicities. 
Moreover, many studies estimate the effect of the characteristics of jobs on 
students who have already dropped out from school. This kind of data hinders an 
analysis of the characteristics of jobs on every student; because some students may 
have access to different information about the jobs available. In other words, some 
students who are still in school might want to drop out if they had sufficient 
information about the job available. This study applies choice experiment to measure 
value characteristics of those jobs preferred by secondary students. 
In valuing the incentives for recruiting potential teachers, this research is a 
pioneer in applying the choice experiment analysis to measure the characteristics of 
difficulties facing the teaching profession, the possibility of moving to non-teaching 
jobs, and non-direct monetary incentives. 
 
1.4. Organization 
 
Chapter two explains the current economic and educational development in 
Cambodia and Laos. It also includes the situation of school dropout for primary, lower 
6 
 
secondary, and upper secondary in Cambodia and Laos. Chapter three discusses the 
impact of employment growth on out-of-school children. Chapter four examines the 
effect of jobs’ characteristics on the possibility of secondary students to drop out and 
work. Chapter five explains the valuation of incentives to recruit potential teachers 
and shows the possibility that the potential teacher would not join the teaching 
profession. Chapter six concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT AND SCHOOL DROPOUTS 
 IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS 
 
2.1. Recent economic and education development 
 
2.1.1. Economic development 
 
Cambodia and Laos are located in the center of the Indochina Peninsula. 
Cambodia has an area of 181,035 square kilometers, a border with Thailand to the 
West, Laos to the Northeast, Vietnam to the East, and the Gulf of Thailand to the 
Southwest. Laos has an area of 236,800 square kilometers, a border to Thailand to the 
West, Myanmar to the Northwest, China to the North, Vietnam to the East, and 
Cambodia to the South. In 2013, Cambodia and Laos had a population of about 15.1 
and 6.7 million, respectively. 
 Cambodia and Laos have high economic growth. From 2005 to 2013, the 
annual GDP growth rate of Cambodia was about 7.5 percent and Laos was about 8.2 
percent (World Bank, 2015). The high economic growth increased GDP per capita of 
Cambodia and Laos from 471 USD and 472 USD in 2005 to 1,007 USD and 1,661 
USD in 2013, respectively.  
In 2013, the share of Cambodian GDP was comprised of 34 percent 
agricultural sector, 26 percent in the industrial sector, and 40 percent in the service 
sector. In the same year, Laos had 27 percent in the agricultural sector, 33 percent in 
the industrial sector, and 40 percent in the service sector (World Bank, 2015). 
Although the agricultural sector in both countries was less than haft of GDP, the 
majority of the labor force are in the agricultural sector. The proportion of labor in the 
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agricultural sector to total labor force is about 51.0 percent in Cambodia (ILO, 2015) 
and 68.4 percent in Laos (NERI, 2013). 
 
2.1.2. Education development 
 
The Cambodian and Lao educational sectors are in process of development. 
After the revolution in 1970s, Laos started widespread education development while 
Cambodia had a later start due to the civil war. The highest administration body of 
education sector in Cambodia is the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport and in 
Laos is the Ministry of Education and Sports. The next level of administration is the 
provincial education office, followed by the district education office, and the school. 
Figure 2.1 shows the share of GDP of public expenditure on education. From 
the year 1999/2000 to 2004/05, the share of GDP of public spending on education was 
about two percent in both Cambodia and Laos. In 2009/10, the share increased in both 
countries to 2.6 percent in Cambodia and 3.3 percent in Laos (UIS, 2012). In addition, 
the share of public expenditure on education to total government expenditure is 13.2 
percent in Laos. For Cambodia, the education finance is divided into several 
administrations thus it is difficult to observe as a share of total government 
expenditure. 
Figure 2.2 shows the net enrolment ratio by gender from 2006/07 to 2010/11 
in Cambodia and Laos. Overall, the ratios increased continuously over the period. The 
ratios in Laos started from a lower level but grew at a higher rate than the ratios in 
Cambodia. In 2006/07, the net enrollment ratios for male and female were 93.2 
percent and 91.0 percent in Cambodia and 88.0 percent and 85.0 percent in Laos. The 
ratios grew to 95.8 percent and 94.6 percent in Cambodia and 94.9 percent and 93.3 
percent in Laos. 
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Figure 2.1 – Share of GDP of Public Expenditure on Education 
 
Source: UIS, 2012. 
 
Figure 2.2 – National Net Enrollment Ratio of Primary Level by Gender 
 
Source: Cambodian Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport 2013 and Lao 
Ministry of Education and Sports 2013. 
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Although the net enrollment ratios had a high growth, the survival rates are 
low in both countries. Figure 2.3 shows the primary survival rate from 1999/00 to 
2009/10 in Cambodia and Laos. The Cambodian survival rate was 55 percent in 
1999/00, 57 percent in 2004/05, and 54 percent in 2009/10. The rate seems to be fairly 
constant which shows that nearly half of all students do not complete primary 
education. For Laos, the survival rate increased but following a slow trend. It was 55 
percent in 1999/00, 57 percent in 2004/05, and 67 percent in 2009/10. The figure 
shows that many students did not complete primary level to continue to a higher level 
of education. The school life expectancy in both countries is in the lowest group when 
compared to the East Asia and Pacific countries. In 2010, the life expectancy for the 
primary to lower secondary education, which is netted of repetition, is 8.5 years in 
Cambodia and 7.5 years in Laos (UIS, 2012). 
 
Figure 2.3 – National Primary Survival Rate to Last grade 
 
Source: UIS, 2012. 
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2.2. School dropout 
 
2.2.1. Dropout at national level 
 
Figure 2.2 and 2.3 show the dropout rate in primary, lower secondary and 
upper secondary education by gender from 2005/06 to 2009/10 in Cambodia and from 
2006/07 to 2012/13 in Laos. In Cambodia, the dropout rates in 2005/06 of male and 
female were 11.3 and 11.9 percent for primary, 21.1 and 24.9 percent for lower 
secondary, and 16.2 and 15.5 percent for upper secondary level. Beyond that, the 
dropout rates for male and female decreased to 8.8 and 8.7 percent for primary, 19.1 
and 19.9 percent for lower secondary, and 14.2 and 12.6 percent for upper secondary 
level in 2009/10. In Laos, the dropout rates for male and female were 9.2 and 9.5 
percent for primary, 12.3 and 10.6 percent for lower secondary, and 8.2 and 8.5 
percent for upper secondary level in 2006/07. In 2012/13, the rates in Laos fell to 6.7 
and 6.1 percent for primary, 9.0 and 8.0 for lower secondary, and 8.0 and 7.3 for upper 
secondary level. 
Generally, school dropout rates followed a decreasing trend in both countries. 
The dropout rates in Cambodia were higher than in Laos in any level of education. 
The highest dropout rates were in the lower secondary level and the lowest rates were 
in the primary level. Male dropout rate is higher than female dropout rate in most 
cases. In Cambodia, the highest dropout rate in 2009/10 was in female lower 
secondary, followed by male lower secondary, male upper secondary, female upper 
secondary, male primary, and female primary. In Laos, the highest rate in 2012/13 
was male lower secondary, followed by female lower secondary, male upper 
secondary, female upper secondary, male primary, and female primary. 
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Figure 2.2 –National Dropout Rate by Level and Gender in Cambodia 
 
Source: Cambodian Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport 2013 and Lao 
Ministry of Education and Sports 2013. 
 
Figure 2.3 – National Dropout Rate by Level and Gender in Laos 
 
Source: Cambodian Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport 2013 and Lao 
Ministry of Education and Sports 2013. 
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2.2.2. Dropout by gender 
 
There is a small difference between male and female dropout rates. Table 2.1 
shows the average dropout rate of female and male students by level of education in 
Cambodia and Laos. The average rate for Cambodia is calculated over 2005/06 to 
2009/10 and for Laos is over 2006/07 to 2012/13. The average dropout rates in 
Cambodia for male and female were 9.9 and 9.4 percent for primary, 20.0 and 21.8 
percent for lower secondary, and 14.2 and 12.6 percent for upper secondary in 
Cambodia. The average dropout rates in Laos for male and female were 7.7 and 7.4 
percent for Primary, 11.4 and 10.0 percent for lower secondary, and 9.1 and 8.0 
percent for upper secondary level. The male dropout rates were higher than the female 
dropout rates in every level, except the Cambodian lower secondary. 
 
Table 2.1 – Dropout Rate by Gender 
 Cambodia Laos 
Level of Education Male Female Male Female 
Primary Education 9.9 9.4 7.7 7.4 
Lower Secondary Education 20.0 21.8 11.4 10.0 
Upper Secondary Education 14.2 12.6 9.1 8.0 
Source: Source: Cambodian Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport 2013 and 
Lao Ministry of Education and Sports 2013. Note: Cambodian rates are from 
2005/06 to 2009/10 and Lao rates are from 206/07 to 20012/13. 
 
2.2.3. Dropout by grade 
 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 demonstrate the 2011/12 dropout rates by grade and gender 
in Cambodia and Laos, respectively. In Cambodia, dropout rates for male and female 
in primary level (first to sixth grade) fluctuated and did not follow a trend. After grade 
six, the sharply increased in the first grade of lower secondary level (seventh grade) 
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which also has the highest rates of all grades (22.7 percent for male and 22.2 percent 
for female). In the upper secondary level, the rates declined. 
 
Figure 2.4 – Cambodian Dropout Rate by Grade and Gender in 2011/12 
 
Source: Cambodian Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport 2013 and Lao 
Ministry of Education and Sports 2013. 
 
In Laos, the dropout rates for male and female were 12.0 and 11.3 percent in 
the first grade and decreased to 4.7 and 3.1 percent in the fifth grade. Then, the dropout 
rates markedly increased to the highest point (14.3 percent for male and 12.0 percent 
for female) in the sixth grade (first grade of lower secondary level) before gradually 
dropping to the final grade of the lower secondary level. In the first grade of upper 
secondary level (tenth grade), the dropout rates again jump to a very high level (12.4 
percent for male and 11.5 percent for female). In the later grades, the dropout rates 
decline. 
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Figure 2.5 – Lao Dropout Rate by Grade and Gender in 2011/12 
 
Source: Cambodian Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport 2013 and Lao 
Ministry of Education and Sports 2013. 
 
These figures suggest that dropout rates for both male and female pupils were 
very high in the first grade of each education level (primary, lower secondary, and 
upper secondary). The possible reasons for the high rates in the first of grade of each 
education level is that, first, earlier grade contains many students with potential to 
dropout; thus when students start to dropout, there will be fewer remaining students 
with the potential dropout. Secondly, students in later grades have a fewer year to 
complete their education, so they are more likely to stay and complete the level. One 
more worth noting is that the highest rate for both male and female in both Cambodia 
and Laos were at the first grade of lower secondary level. This might be because 
children at the lower secondary level are about 12 years old, an age which is 
appropriate to start working and earning. 
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2.2.4. Dropout by province  
 
Table 2.2 and 2.3 report the 2011/12 dropout rate in primary, lower secondary, 
and upper secondary education at the provincial level in Cambodia and Laos. There 
are 24 regions (capital city and provinces) in Cambodia and 17 regions in Laos.  
The provincial dropout rates varied in each level of education. In Cambodia, 
the dropout rate at primary level was high in provinces like Koh Kang (18.0 percent), 
Stung Treng (16.8 percent), and Ratanak Kiri (16.5 percent) while it was low in 
Kampong Chhang (3.4 percent), Kandal (4.1 percent), and Takeo (4.1 percent). At 
lower secondary level, the highest rates were in Otdar Meanchey (31.6 percent), 
Banteay Meanchey (26.6 percent), and Kampong Spue (26.5 percent) and low in Koh 
Kang (13.5 percent), Phnom Penh (14.9 percent), and Kep (15.2 percent). At upper 
secondary, Otdar Meanchey had the highest rate of 29.5 percent, followed by Mondul 
Kiri (26.3 percent) and Pursat (22.0 percent). The dropout rate at upper secondary 
were low in Phnom Penh (7.1 percent), Preah Vihear (11.4 percent), Takeo (12.8 
percent). 
In Laos, the provinces with highest dropout rate in primary education were 
Saravan (15.0 percent), Attapue (11.3 percent), and Sekong (11.0 percent); while the 
provinces which had low rates were Sayabury (2.1 percent), Vientiane capital (2.4 
percent), and Vientiane province (3.5 percent). At lower secondary, the dropout rate 
was high in Saravan (14.9 percent), Phongsaly (14.6 percent), and Champasak (13.9 
percent). In contrast, provinces with a low dropout rate were Vientiane Capital (6.4 
percent), Luangnamtha (7.0 percent), and Huaphan (8.0 percent). For upper secondary 
level, the dropout rate in every province was less than 10 percent. The highest rate 
was in provinces such as Savannakhet (9.7 percent), Khammouan (9.0 percent), 
Saravan (8.9 percent). Conversely, provinces with lowest rate were Phongsaly (2.5), 
Sekong (3.7 percent), Sayaboury (4.9 percent). 
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Table 2.2 – Dropout Rates by Cambodian Provinces in 2011/12 
Province Primary 
Lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary 
Banteay meanchey 9.2 26.6 19.7 
Battambang 8.7 22.9 21.7 
Kampong cham 7.6 23.7 15.6 
Kampong chhang 3.4 20.9 17.2 
Kampong speu 9.2 26.5 21.0 
Kampong thom 8.7 24.6 13.0 
Kampot 6.7 18.9 15.3 
Kandal 4.1 17.8 13.7 
Kep 5.2 15.2 20.6 
Koh kong 18.0 13.5 15.7 
Kratie 9.9 18.8 15.9 
Mondul kiri 12.1 24.8 26.3 
Otdar meanchey 11.8 31.6 29.5 
Pailin 10.1 15.3 13.6 
Phnom penh 5.5 14.9 7.1 
Preah sihanouk 11.1 18.8 11.4 
Preah vihear 10.1 17.9 19.0 
Prey veng 6.5 24.5 18.7 
Pursat 8.7 21.4 22.0 
Ratanak kiri 16.5 19.5 13.1 
Siemreap 9.7 20.4 17.4 
Stung treng 16.8 16.8 15.0 
Svay rieng 5.0 24.3 15.5 
Takeo 4.1 18.3 12.8 
Source: Cambodian Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport 2013. 
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Table 2.3 – Dropout Rates by Lao Provinces in 2011/12 
Province Primary 
Lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary 
Attapeu 11.3 12.4 7.0 
Bokeo 5.0 8.2 7.3 
Borikhamxay 4.2 11.3 8.8 
Champasak 8.3 13.9 7.4 
Houaphan 6.2 8.0 6.5 
Khammouan 6.5 13.4 9.0 
Luangnamtha 5.4 7.0 6.8 
Luangprabang 6.5 10.9 5.8 
Oudomxay 10.1 9.0 5.7 
Phongsaly 10.0 14.6 2.5 
Saravan 15.0 14.9 8.9 
Savannakhet 9.7 13.3 9.7 
Sayaboury 2.1 8.8 4.9 
Sekong 11.0 8.5 3.7 
Vientiane Capital 2.4 6.4 6.3 
Vientiane 3.5 9.9 8.2 
Xiengkhoang 3.9 8.6 7.7 
Source: Lao Ministry of Education and Sports 2013. 
 
Figure 2.6 and 2.7 are maps of the dropout rates of primary, lower secondary, 
and upper secondary in 2011/12 in Cambodia and Laos, respectively. The figures 
show how the dropout rates were distributed at the provincial level. At the primary 
level in Cambodia, the center and southeast parts of the country had lower dropout 
rates. For lower and upper secondary levels, the high dropout rates were not in one 
particular part of the country. In Laos, the primary dropout rate was high in northern 
and southern provinces, while at lower secondary level, some northern provinces and 
many southern provinces had a high dropout rate. The dropout rate for upper 
secondary level was high in the central provinces. 
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Figure 2.6 – Dropout Rate by Province and Educational Level in Cambodia, 2011/12 
 
Primary     Lower secondary          Upper secondary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Source: Cambodian Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport 2013. 
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Figure 2.7 – Dropout Rate by Province and Educational Level in Laos, 2011/12 
 
Primary     Lower secondary          Upper secondary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Lao Ministry of Education and Sports 2013. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT GROWTH ON OUT-OF-SCHOOL 
CHILDREN IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Growth of employment in labor market increases job opportunities and the 
level of wages. The growth is expected to reduce the number of out-of-school children. 
More jobs and higher wage levels increase income and economic resources of 
households which are believed to support school enrolment and study performance of 
children (Mariara and Mwabu, 2007; Fehrmann, 1987; Barnard, 2004; Kim and 
Sherraden, 2011; and Nam and Huang, 2009). Figure 3.1 shows the number of out of 
primary school children and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita globally. As 
GDP per capita increases, the number of out-of-school children decreases. The figure 
shows a potential negative relationship of the GDP per capita to the out-of-school 
children. 
However, most research and historical evidence seems to suggest the opposite 
effect.  The growth of employment is a potential cause for increasing child labor which 
consequently increases number of out-of-school children. Heywoods (1988) states 
that the beginning of industrialization raised the number of child workers in United 
Kingdom. Swaminathan (1998) also found that child labor increases in several fast 
growing regions of India. In developing countries, when there are more job available, 
particularly in economic sectors which require low skill labor such as agriculture and 
basic service, households might directly send children to work as an additional income 
source. Also, although adults take the available jobs for themselves, children might 
be made to stay at home to look after farming or take care of some family members 
22 
 
(Kak, 2004; Kambhampati and Rajan, 2005). Both situations show the potential effect 
of employment growth on the number of out-of-school children. 
 
Figure 3.1 – World Out-of-School Children in Primary by Gender and GDP per 
capita 
 
Source: World Bank Data, 2015. Note: Out of primary school children is in 
10,000 people and GDP per capita is in current USD. 
 
Moreover, although some children can work and study at the same time, there 
is high chance that they will drop out from school. For example, students might skip 
class during harvesting season to help on a family farm or to work and earn an extra 
money on other farms. Stopping going to school for a period often leads to school 
dropout (UCW, 2010; Adamssie, 2003; McNeal, 1997). 
Currently, Cambodia and Laos have high growth of employment, but face a 
high number of out-of-school children. In 2013, the economic grew by 7 percent in 
Cambodia and 9 percent in Laos (World Bank, 2015). The number of out-of-school 
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Pacific countries as shown in the appendix 3.1. This shows the possibility that growth 
reduces the number of children in schools in these countries. 
Previous research focused on the effect of employment growth on increasing 
child labor. However, it is rare to see studies which focus on the effect of growth on 
out-of-school children, or in other words, on school dropout and non-enrollment in 
school. Thus, the objectives of this study are: 
 
a. To analyze the effect of employment growth on school dropout 
b. To estimate the effect of employment growth on non-enrollment in school 
c. To distinguish the effect between different genders and ethnicity 
 
Section 3.2 will describe the situation of out-of-school children and child labor 
in Cambodia and Laos. The literature review is in Section 3.3. An analytical 
framework and econometric specification are explained in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 is 
a description of the data. Section 3.6 discusses the findings and Section 3.7 concludes 
the research. 
 
3.2. The situation of out-of-school children and child labor in Cambodia and 
Laos 
 
3.2.1. Out-of-school children 
 
The proportion of out-of-school children in Cambodia and Laos is high. A 
report from the Understanding Children’s Work program shows a significant number 
of out-of-school children in South East Asian countries (UCW, 2014). Figure 3.2 
illustrates the ratio of the out-of-school children in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. 
Laos has the highest rate in both the 7 to 14 year old group (11.6 percent) and the 10 
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to 14 year old group (12.3 percent). The rates are 7.4 and 7.5 percent in Cambodia, 
and 3.7 and 5.2 percent in Vietnam respectively.  
 
Figure 3.2 – Percentage of Out-of-school Children 
 
Source: Based on UCW, 2014. 
 
Figure 3.3 – Percentage of Children Out-of-school for Work 
 
Source: Based on UCW, 2014. 
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Moreover, Laos also has the highest share of out-of-school children for 
employment purposes. As shown in Figure 3.3, children who need to be out-of-school 
because of work are 82.1 percent in Laos, 48.0 percent in Cambodia, and 61.5 percent 
in Vietnam. Both Figures 3.2 and 3.3 suggest that children in Laos have a high 
probability to be out-of-school and particularly for employment reasons. 
 
3.2.2. Child labor by age, gender, and residence 
 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the percentage of employed children according to their 
age in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The figure shows that the percentage of working 
children increases as age increases. The percentage for 5 to 11 year old children 
(primary school age) is 4.0 percent in Cambodia, 4.1 percent in Laos, and 3.7 percent 
in Vietnam. When children reach the age of 12 to 14 year old (lower secondary school 
age), the percentage increases to 15.8 percent in Cambodia, 15.1 percent in Laos, and 
19.2 percent in Vietnam. Finally, for children 15 to 17 year old (upper secondary 
school age), the percentage is 28.6 percent in Cambodia, 25.8 percent in Laos, 30.7 
percent in Vietnam. The percentages in each aged group are slightly different among 
counties. 
Figure 3.5 and 3.6 shows the percentage of 5 to 14 year old children in 
employment by gender and residence, respectively. The percentage of female children 
in work is higher than the percentage of male children in Cambodia and Laos, but the 
male making percentage is higher than the female percentage in Vietnam. The 
percentage for male children in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are 7.7, 6.7, and 8.9 
percent, respectively; while the percentage for female children is 8.2, 8.7, and 7.7 
percent, respectively. 
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Figure 3.4 – Percentage of Children in Employment to Total Aged Group 
 
Source: Based on UCW, 2014. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 – Percentage of 5 to 14 Year old Children in Employment by Gender 
 
Source: Based on UCW, 2014. 
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By residence, in rural areas, there is a higher percentage of working children 
compared to urban areas in every country. The percentage of working children in 
urban areas is 4.2 in Cambodia, 2.2 in Laos, and 3.4 in Vietnam; and for rural areas, 
the percentage is 8.9, 9.2, and 10.3 percent in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 3.6 – Percentage of 5 to 14 Year old Children in Employment by Residence 
 
Source: Based on UCW, 2014. 
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other types of work. In Cambodia, the second highest share is in construction (17.7 
percent) followed by the manufacturing (13.2 percent) and other work (7.7 percent). 
For Vietnam, the share in manufacturing is 5.9 percent, construction 8.1 percent, and 
other work 8.9 percent.  
Many children work as unpaid labor for their families. Figure 3.8 shows the 
working status of 5 to 14 year old children. In Cambodia, the share of unpaid family 
employment is 77.1 percent, self-employment is 3.2 percent, and for paid jobs is 19.7 
percent. For Laos, unpaid employment is 80.9 percent, self-employment is 15.9 
percent, and paid job is 3.2 percent. For Vietnam, the unpaid family share is 84.3 
percent, self-employment is 8.1 percent, and paid job is 7.6 percent. 
 
Figure 3.7 – Percentage by Economic Sector of 5 to 14 Year Old Children’s 
Employment 
 
Source: Based on UCW, 2014. 
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Figure 3.8 – Percentage of Status of 5 to 14 Year Old Children’s Employment 
 
Source: Based on UCW, 2014. 
 
3.3. Literature review 
 
The direct effect of employment growth on the out-of-school children is 
caused by increasing of child labor. Many studies investigate factors that determine 
increase in child labor. The factors influencing child labor can be divided into demand 
and supply sides. The demand side factors are the employment situation in the labor 
market, while the supply side factors are things such as household economic condition, 
school service, etc. The growth of employment can influence both supply and demand 
factors. 
When the economy grows, businesses expand their production by investing 
more capital and recruiting more labor. In minimizing the cost of production, 
businesses are likely to hire cheap labor; and if the available jobs are for unskilled 
labor, then there is the possibility that children will be employed. A study by Heywood 
(1988) states that there is a significant increase in child labor in the period of 
77.1
80.9
84.3
3.2
15.9
8.1
19.7
3.2
7.6
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Cambodia
Laos
Vietnam
Unpaid family Self-employed Paid
30 
 
industrialization. However, since adults also participate and earn more; the incidence 
of child labor declines in later periods (Horrell and Humphries, 1995). Swaminathan 
(1998) shows increasing child labor in the fast growing regions of India. 
Kambhampati and Rajan (2006) also investigate the effect of employment growth on 
child labor in India. They found that a higher level of average village wage and 
regional domestic production decreases child labor, however a higher share of 
agricultural production increases the probability of child labor. 
The growth of employment also increases the effect of supply side factors. 
When the benefits from available jobs increases, the opportunity cost of schooling for 
children also increases. As the opportunity cost increases, children from poor 
households might drop out from school to go to work. Poverty is a major factor that 
drives child labor (Basu and Van, 1998). In addition, the high cost of schooling lowers 
the probability of children to enrolling in school, especially children from poor 
households (Kitaura, 2009; Hunt, 2008; Hammond et al., 2007; Sabates et al., 2010). 
Moreover, students are more likely to drop out from school if it is difficult to access 
a school, for example students who need to travel long distances with poor roads 
condition in rural areas (Hunt, 2008; Sabates et al., 2010). 
The indirect effect of employment growth on out-of-school children is when 
children need to be substituted for adult labor, for example when children need to drop 
out from school to take over household works from adults (Kak, 2004). When there 
are jobs available in places like factories, adults are likely to take these jobs rather 
than children (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Lieten, 2002). Furthermore, parents who 
have their own businesses are likely to make their children work (Edmonds and Turk, 
2004).  
 
3.4. Methodology 
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3.4.1. Analytical framework 
 
A household decision to send a child to school is dependent on the expected 
return from the child’s human capital and the cost of schooling. From a study by 
Gertler and Glewwe (1990), the expected household utility conditional on a decision 
to send a child to school is as: 
 
[3.1] 𝑈1 = 𝑈(𝑆1, 𝐶1) + 𝜀1  
 
where 𝑆1 is an increment human capital of the child from another year of schooling, 
𝐶1 is a consumption possible after incurring of the cost of schooling. The cost of 
schooling includes both direct and indirect costs. The direct costs consists of school 
tuition fee, transportation, etc. The indirect costs includes forgone possible income 
from child labor when the child is in school. 𝜀 is a random taste shifter.  
In the opposite case, the expected utility of household which does not send the 
child to school would be: 
 
[3.2] 𝑈0 = 𝑈(𝐶0) + 𝜀0 
 
where 𝐶0 is the consumption possible without incurring the cost of schooling. The 
budget constraint of the expected utility function is 
 
[3.3] 𝐶1 + 𝑃 = 𝐶0 = 𝑌, 
 
where P is the total cost for sending the child to school and Y is a total household 
disposable income. From equation [3.1] and [3.2], the unconditional utility 
maximization problem is as 
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[3.4] 𝑈∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑈0, 𝑈1) 
 
where 𝑈∗ is the maximized utility. From the maximization problem, if the expected 
utility from sending the child to school is higher than the expected utility of not 
sending the child to school, then household would keep the child in school. And when 
the expected utility of not sending the child to school is greater than the utility of 
sending the child to school, the household would keep the child out of school (Gertler 
and Glewwe, 1990). 
The growth of economic sectors that require unskilled labor increases the 
indirect cost, which is the forgone income for sending the child to school and 
substituted labor for household work. When the indirect cost is high, the expected 
utility of not sending the child to school is likely to exceed the expected utility of 
sending the child to school. Therefore, the child is dropped from or never enrolled in 
school. 
 
3.4.2. Econometric equation 
 
For utility maximization, households must select whether to send a child to 
school or not. In discrete choice analysis, if one alternative is chosen, then the utility 
is maximized. The relevant factors that influence the probability of selecting the 
alternatives are stated in an econometric equation below: 
 
[3.5] P(OSj=1) = f(Female, Khmer/Lao, HHHeducation, HHincome, HHchild, 
          P-income, P-agriculture, P-service) 
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where OS is a binary variable that indicates whether a school age child is in or out of 
school. As mentioned, the effect of employment growth can be direct and/or indirect 
on out-of-school children; thus, the dependent variable specifies children who are in 
or out of school, regardless of whether they are working.  
Table 3.1 shows the definition and measurement of variables of equation [3.5]. 
There are two types of the dependent variable (j = 1, 2). The first type is the school 
dropout which is equal to one if an individual child had enrolled in school but later 
dropped out, and zero for otherwise. The second type is whether the child has ever 
enrolled in school. It is equal to one if the child has never enrolled in school and zero 
for otherwise. The independent variables are a binary variable, thus the equation [3.5] 
is estimated by logit model (the maximum likelihood estimation). The coefficients 
from the estimation are reported in the average marginal effect form. 
  
Table 3.1 – Definition and Hypothesized Sign of Variables 
Variables Definition and measurement 
Hypothesized 
sign 
   
Dependent variables 
   
Dropout 1 = dropped out from school, 0 = otherwise.  
Non-enrollment 1 = never enrolled in school, 0 = otherwise.  
   
Independent variables 
   
Female 1 = female, 0 = otherwise. + 
Khmer/Lao 1 = Khmer in Cambodia/Lao in Laos, 0 = otherwise. – 
HHHeducation Education year of head of household. – 
HHincome Logarithm form of household expenditure per capita. – 
HHchild Number of school age children in family. + 
P-income 
Logarithm form of 2011 provincial sale in Cambodia 
and 2012 estimated provincial GDP in Laos. 
– 
P-agriculture Logarithm form of provincial rice product. + 
P-service Logarithm form of provincial service building. + 
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Table 3.1 also explains a hypothesized sign of the independent variables. 
Female and Khmer/Lao are variables which indicate female gender and whether a 
child is from the ethnic majority. Female children are expected to have higher 
probability to be out of school; while ethnic majority children (Khmer for Cambodia 
and Lao for Laos) are hypothesized to have a lower possibility to be out of school. 
HHHeducation, HHincome, and HHchild variables are the head of household’s 
education, household income level, and the number of school aged children in a 
household, respectively. They are used to control household socio-economic status. 
HHHeducation is expected to have a negative effect on the out-of-school children 
because a head of household with high education level seems to understand the 
importance of education and support his or her child’s education. Also, HHincome is 
supposed to reduce the probability of a child being out of school, because when 
household income increases, the educational resource for child’s education is 
expected to increase to support a child in school. In practice, household expenditure 
per capita is used as a proxy of the household income. An increasing number of school 
aged children in household (HHchild) is hypothesized to lower the probability of a 
child enrolling in school, because households face budget constraints in sending many 
children to school, and would select only some children to enter in schools.  
P-income is the provincial general income level, P-agriculture is the 
provincial agricultural production level, and P-service is the provincial service 
production level. P-income is used to represent the level of development of the 
province such as infrastructure and provision of education, thus P-income is expected 
to reduce the number of out-of-school children. On the other hand, P-agriculture and 
P-service represent the demand for unskilled labor. When the production of both 
sectors grows, there is a higher likelihood of children being out of school. 
35 
 
 There is no precise published data of the provincial income and sectorial 
production levels in both countries. Therefore, this study uses proxy variables for them. 
The P-income variable is the sales volume of the industrial sector in Cambodia and 
the estimated provincial GDP in Laos. The estimated regional GDP is predicted from 
provincial consumption level. A detail of prediction is shown in an appendix 3.2. 
Annual rice production is the proxy for the agricultural production (P-agriculture) in 
both countries. Rice is the main food in both countries which potentially has a high 
share in agricultural production, thus rice production is taken as a proxy for 
agricultural production. P-service is the number of new building for service business 
in the Cambodian case and the stock of buildings for service business in the Lao case. 
An increase in the number of buildings for service business potentially show an 
expansion in service production. 
 
3.5. Data 
 
The unit of analysis is an individual level of children who have school age 
from six to eighteen years old (primary to secondary education). The sample is from 
household surveys; the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey 2012 and the Lao 
Expenditure and Consumption Survey 2012. Both of them are the largest household 
surveys of the year. They are conducted by the Cambodian National Institute of 
Statistics and the Lao Statistics Bureau. 
The provincial level indicators are from the 2012 statistic year book for the 
Lao case. However, the latest published statistic year book for the Cambodia case is 
for year 2011. Therefore, provincial variables for Laos are from 2012, while for 
Cambodia, the P-income is from 2011 and P-agriculture and P-service are from 2010. 
The sales volume of the industry sector is from the 2011 National Economic Census. 
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Data description shows in Table 3.2. The percentage of school dropout is 
higher than non-enrollment. The percentage of children who dropped out from school 
is about 16 percent in Cambodia and 14 percent in Laos, while the percentage of 
children who never enrolled in school is about 5 percent in Cambodia and 8 percent 
in Laos. The female sample size is about half of the total sample in both countries. Of 
Cambodian children, a high 96 percent have Khmer ethnicity; whereas, Lao ethnicity 
children make up 43 percent in the Lao data. 
 
Table 3.2 – Data Description 
Variables 
Cambodia Laos 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
     
Dependent variables 
     
Dropout 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.35 
Neverenrol 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.28 
     
Independent variables 
     
Female 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 
Khmer/Lao 0.96 0.18 0.43 0.49 
HHHeducation 5.30 3.89 3.77 4.15 
HHincome 12.99 0.81 11.02 1.77 
HHchild 2.45 1.16 3.01 1.54 
P-income 6.19 1.36 10.50 1.04 
P-agriculture 5.46 1.52 4.93 0.98 
P-service 3.41 3.54 5.15 0.73 
     
 
3.6. Results and discussion 
 
Table 3.3 and 3.4 show the results of the determinants of school dropout and 
non-enrollment respectively. The coefficients are in the average marginal effect form. 
In each table, there are five columns for each country. 
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Table 3.3 – Result of School Dropout 
 Cambodia Laos 
Variables 
Total Female Male Khmer 
Non-
Khmer 
Total Female Male Lao Non-Lao 
           
Female -0.007   -0.006 -0.037 0.033***   0.019* 0.044*** 
 (-0.692)   (-0.550) (-0.773) (4.643)   (1.870) (4.522) 
Khmer/Lao 0.032 0.048 0.014   -0.009 -0.028** 0.008   
 (1.342) (1.582) (0.386)   (-1.050) (-2.070) (0.676)   
HHHeducation -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.013*** 0.009 -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.005*** 
 (-7.388) (-5.624) (-4.794) (-7.807) (0.928) (-7.179) (-4.630) (-5.662) (-6.367) (-3.161) 
HHincome -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.126*** -0.004* -0.004 -0.003 -0.012*** 0.004 
 (-4.254) (-3.103) (-2.964) (-3.961) (-3.206) (-1.702) (-1.297) (-1.017) (-4.006) (1.351) 
HHchild -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.012 0.000 -0.004 0.004 0.002 0.000 
 (-1.311) (-1.145) (-0.736) (-0.916) (-0.586) (0.186) (-0.974) (1.340) (0.476) (0.138) 
P-income 0.003 -0.004 0.012* -0.001 0.138*** -0.043*** -0.037*** -0.048*** -0.037*** -0.032** 
 (0.715) (-0.680) (1.692) (-0.111) (3.651) (-5.209) (-3.025) (-4.398) (-3.069) (-2.537) 
P-agriculture 0.011*** 0.010* 0.012** 0.008* 0.061*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.042*** 0.053*** 0.031*** 
 (2.636) (1.729) (1.998) (1.905) (3.256) (7.550) (5.273) (5.467) (5.973) (3.898) 
P-service 0.003* 0.000 0.005** 0.003** 0.027** 0.017** 0.005 0.028*** -0.006 0.023** 
 (1.827) (0.173) (2.355) (1.971) (2.153) (2.120) (0.415) (2.697) (-0.413) (2.321) 
           
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 
Log likelihood -2060 -1003 -1053 -1980 -63 -3389 -1818 -1566 -1411 -1960 
Observations 4,720 2,360 2,360 4,555 165 8,654 4,304 4,350 3,747 4,907 
Note: Reported parameters are in average marginal effect, z-statistics in parentheses, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.4 – Result of Non-Enrollment in School 
 Cambodia Laos 
Variables 
Total Female Male Khmer 
Non-
Khmer 
Total Female Male Lao Non-Lao 
           
Female 0.002   0.006 -0.117** 0.011***   -0.009** 0.031*** 
 (0.402)   (1.092) (-2.092) (2.941)   (-2.110) (4.363) 
Khmer/Lao -0.056*** -0.014 -0.101***   -0.051*** -0.062*** -0.040***   
 (-2.762) (-0.643) (-2.827)   (-10.004) (-8.176) (-5.899)   
HHHeducation -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.002*** -0.021*** 
 (-1.430) (-1.437) (-0.564) (-1.191) (-0.525) (-13.130) (-8.608) (-9.966) (-3.557) (-12.798) 
HHincome -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.100** -0.002** -0.003* -0.001 -0.001 -0.004* 
 (-9.698) (-6.961) (-6.641) (-9.452) (-2.217) (-2.000) (-1.852) (-0.906) (-0.803) (-1.724) 
HHchild -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.028 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.002 0.001 0.007*** 
 (-0.402) (-0.946) (0.346) (-1.112) (1.521) (3.387) (3.655) (1.033) (0.963) (3.209) 
P-income 0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.025 -0.033*** -0.047*** -0.017** -0.003 -0.064*** 
 (0.579) (0.862) (-0.092) (0.575) (0.593) (-6.743) (-6.821) (-2.474) (-0.565) (-6.517) 
P-agriculture -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.029 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.048*** 
 (-0.012) (-0.035) (0.062) (0.599) (-1.168) (9.072) (6.538) (6.249) (5.517) (8.055) 
P-service -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.011*** 0.023*** -0.003 -0.016** 0.026*** 
 (-1.438) (-0.871) (-1.190) (-1.547) (-0.003) (2.866) (4.262) (-0.477) (-2.366) (3.617) 
           
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.08 
Log likelihood -978 -494 -481 -904 -67 -2050 -1060 -972 -487 -1533 
Observations 4,720 2,360 2,360 4,555 165 8,654 4,304 4,350 3,747 4,907 
Note: Reported parameters are in average marginal effect, z-statistics in parentheses, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The first column is the result from the total sample, followed by a breakdown 
into female, male, major ethnicity, and non-major ethnicity. The Pseudo R-squared, 
log likelihood, and number of observations are presented at the bottom of the tables. 
In general, the Pseudo R-squared in the dropout estimation is about three percent for 
both countries, except the non-Khmer ethnicity case which is 17 percent. For non-
enrollment estimation, the Pseudo R-squared is from 6 to 13 percent. 
 
3.6.1. School dropout 
 
In Table 3.3, Female variable is statistically significant in Laos but not in 
Cambodia. It shows that there is no difference in school dropout between male and 
female children in Cambodia; but, female children are more likely to drop out from 
school than male children in Laos. In particular, female children in the non-Lao 
ethnicity group have a higher propensity to drop out than in the Lao ethnicity group. 
The variable of Khmer/Lao is statistically significant only in the female group of the 
Lao sample. It shows a negative sign which suggests that, Lao female ethnicity 
children are less likely to drop out than non-Lao ethnicity female children.  
The head of household education (HHHeducation) has a negative effect on 
school dropout and statistically significant at the one percent level in every case, 
except for the non-Khmer ethnicity group. The result shows the importance of head 
of household education in reducing the probability of school dropout. Similarly, the 
household income level also illustrates a negative effect and is statistically significant 
in every case for Cambodia and several cases for Laos. A possible reason to explain 
the different statistical significance between Cambodia and Laos is that school 
enrollment in Cambodia is largely influenced by the wealth of the household; while 
in Laos, access to education is expanded to more different income household levels. 
Finally, the number of school aged children in a household does not have any effect 
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on dropout in any cases. This insignificant result might be because of the correlation 
between the number of children in a household and household income level. Overall, 
every variable, except HHchild, has a hypothesized sign and is statistically significant. 
For provincial income level, the effect is different in Cambodia and Laos. In 
Cambodia, the effect is positive and statistically significant for male and non-Khmer 
ethnicity groups. On the other hand, the effect in Laos is consistently negative and 
statistically significant. The different sign for Cambodia and Laos might be due to the 
different type of proxy that is used. For interpretation, the result in the Lao case is 
used because of its consistency. The negative sign shows that growth in provincial 
income reduces the number of school dropouts. The result is as expected. Increasing 
provincial income, firstly, increases household income which supports children’s 
education, and secondly, provides better infrastructure and other public services such 
as schools which consequently reduce school dropout. 
The proxy for an expansion of agricultural production (P-agriculture) has an 
expected result. P-agriculture has a positive sign and is statistically significant for 
every case in both Cambodia and Laos. The result suggests that the growth of 
agricultural production, which potentially increases the number of unskilled jobs, 
increases the probability of school dropout. Overall, its effect in Cambodia is smaller 
than in Laos. The effect for the total sample is 0.011 in Cambodia and 0.044 in Laos. 
The effect on female and male children is very similar in Cambodia (0.010 for female 
and 0.012 for male) and in Laos (0.047 for female and 0.042 for male children). The 
effect for non-Khmer ethnicity children (0.061) is much higher than for Khmer 
ethnicity children (0.008) in Cambodia. While the effect on Lao ethnicity children 
(0.053) is higher than the effect on non-Lao ethnicity children (0.031). The results 
from both countries suggest a similar effect between genders; however, major 
ethnicity children are less effected in Cambodia but more effected in Laos. 
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The P-service variable also has a positive sign and is statistically significant 
in several cases. Similar to P-agriculture, the effect of P-service in Laos is also higher 
than in Cambodia. The effect on the total sample is 0.003 in Cambodia and 0.017 in 
Laos. Unexpectedly, the effect for female children in both countries is very low and 
statistically insignificant. The result shows that male children are impacted by the 
growth of service sector more than female children. It is important to note that the 
proxy for the service sector is the number of buildings, thus the proxy might be 
correlated to the construction sector, which mainly recruits male labor. The effect on 
non-Khmer ethnicity children (0.027) is higher than on Khmer ethnicity children 
(0.003) in Cambodia; while in Laos, the effect on non-Lao ethnicity children only is 
statistically different from zero. Results from both countries suggest a similar 
situation; that is non-major ethnicity children have a higher chance of dropping out 
because of service sector growth. 
 
3.6.2. Non-enrollment in school 
 
In Table 3.4, many determinants on non-enrollment are statistically significant 
in the case of Laos; however, several of them lose their statistical significance in the 
Cambodian case. For Cambodia, the Female variable is statistically significant in the 
Non-Khmer ethnicity group only. It has a negative sign which mean that female 
children have a lower probability to never have enrolled in school than male children. 
In Laos, the Female variable is statistically significant in every case. Generally, 
female children have a higher probability of non-enrolment school than male children. 
Surprisingly, the Female variable is negative in the Lao ethnicity group but positive 
in the Non-Lao ethnicity group. This suggests interesting results. Lao female children 
have a higher probability of enrolling in school than Lao male children; however, non-
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Lao female children, in contrast, have a lower probability of enrolling in school than 
non-Lao male children. 
For ethnicity in Cambodia, Khmer ethnicity children have a lower possibility 
of non-enrollment than non-Khmer ethnicity children in the total and male sample. 
This means that Khmer male children are more likely to enter school than non-Khmer 
male children. In Laos, the variable of Khmer/Lao has a negative sign and is 
statistically significant at the one percent level for both male and female samples. The 
major ethnicity children in Laos are less likely to never enroll in school compared to 
the non-major ethnicity children. 
The head of household education (HHHeducation) also shows a negative sign 
in non-enrollment as also in school dropout. However, this is statistically significant 
in Laos, not in Cambodia. Household income is statistically significant in every 
Cambodian case and in several cases in Laos. The effect of household income on non-
enrollment is also similar to its effect on school dropout. 
Unexpectedly, HHchild and the provincial variables are statistical 
insignificant in the case of Cambodia. The possible reason for the insignificance is 
that non-enrollment in Cambodia is only about 5 percent of the sample size; thus 
several variables cannot be explained by a small variation of the dependent variable. 
Although several variables are statistically insignificant in Cambodia, they 
remain statistically significant in Laos. For non-enrollment, the number of children in 
a household is statistically significant in several cases in Laos, whereas the result from 
school dropout is insignificant. It has a positive sign which means that as the number 
of children in household increases, an individual child would have a lower propensity 
to enroll in school. This result is as expected and consistent with the result of school 
dropout. When there are more children in a household, parents need to select which 
children to educate due to cost of schooling; but when the selected children are in 
school, they are unaffected by the number of children in a household. 
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Provincial income shows a negative effect on non-enrollment in school. It is 
statistically significant for most cases in Laos. This indicates that employment growth 
provides more resources for households to enroll children in school and also support 
the government provision on education supply. 
For non-enrollment, P-agriculture has a positive sign and is statistical 
significant in every sample; and the results are the same in school dropout. The effect 
on female (0.029) is slightly higher than the effect on male children (0.027). 
Furthermore, the effect is higher for non-Lao ethnicity group compared to Lao 
ethnicity group. It show that agricultural production has a bigger impact on non-Lao 
ethnicity children than on Lao ethnicity children. 
The effect of P-service also shows a positive sign. The effect on the total 
sample is 0.011. There, the effect for female children is statistically significant but not 
for male children. This makes sense when we compare the result of non-enrollment to 
school dropout. In Table 3.2, P-service increases the probability for male children to 
dropout, while in Table 3.3, P-service increases the probability of non-enrollment for 
female children only. Growth of the service sector, initially, reduce the possibility for 
female children to enroll, then growth subsequently results in dropping out of school. 
The effect of P-service is positive and very high (0.026) in the non-Lao ethnicity 
sample but negative in the Lao ethnicity sample. A possible reason is that Lao 
ethnicity children use the growth of service as a resource to support children in school. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
Out-of-school children are a major problem worldwide. Cambodia and Laos 
have a high rate of out-of-school children. One of the most important factors that 
drives children out of school is the growth of particular economic sectors. As 
economic sectors growth, business expands production and increases demand for 
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labor. When there is demand for unskilled labor, children might directly drop out of 
school to work for an additional income; or, indirectly stay out of school to substitute 
for adult labor on family farms and/or to take care of family members. This study aims 
to investigate the effect of the growth by economic sector on school dropout and non-
enrollment in school. 
 Household data from 2012 from Cambodia and Laos are used with a logit 
model equation. The unit of analysis is the individual child level. The dependent 
variables are school dropout and non-enrollment in school. The control variables are 
children’s gender and ethnicity, head of household education, household income level, 
and the number of children in a household. The interested variables to be tested are 
provincial income level, provincial agricultural production, and provincial service 
production. The estimation is separated into total sample, female, male, main ethnicity 
(Khmer or Lao), and non-main ethnicity groups. 
 In general, the results suggest that a higher level of provincial income can 
reduce the probability of school dropout and help children to enroll in school. In 
contrast, growth of the agricultural sector pulls children out of school and reduces the 
possibility of school enrolment. Similarly, growth in the service sector increases 
school dropout and reduces the probability for children to enter school. 
 The results from this study are important for policy implementation. They 
show that economic sectors such as agriculture and service increase the number of 
out-of-school children. Thus, the government should be concerned in regions with 
large increases in agricultural and service production. The government should provide 
school support programs or incentives for households to send their children to school 
in the regions. 
 A future study should consider several economic sectors that potentially 
increase the number of out-of-school children. Also future research should use more 
accurate measurement of provincial level indicators, and also be concerned with the 
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effect of employment growth on other education development variables such as the 
quality of education. 
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Appendix 3.1. 
Table A.3. Out of school and dropout in East Asia and the Pacific 
 Out of school rate Cumulative dropout rate 
Country 
Primary Lower 
secondary  
To the last grade 
of primary  
To the last grade of 
lower secondary  
Australia 2.34 0.92 .. .. 
Brunei Darussalam .. 0.32 .. 0.92 
Cambodia 2.59 .. 35.77 38.93 
Cook Islands 1.27 10.29 23.43 17.74 
Fiji 1.31 3.98 2.85 12.69 
Indonesia 4.56 14.81 18.20 15.30 
Japan 0.05 0.11 .. .. 
Laos 6.21 26.59 26.66 25.06 
Malaysia .. 10.07 .. 9.50 
Nauru 23.28 1.36 .. .. 
New Zealand 1.58 0.26 .. .. 
Papua New Guinea 12.84 .. .. .. 
Samoa 3.89 .. .. .. 
Solomon Islands .. .. 25.11 19.81 
Tonga 1.58 5.58 .. .. 
Viet Nam 1.80 .. 5.50 17.81 
East Asia and the Pacific 4.21 8.40 7.48 .. 
Source: UIS, 2015. Note: compared to school education age group. 
Appendix 3.2. 
 The provincial GDP is predicted according to the method adopting from Chow 
and Lin (1971). They predict the quarterly GDP from the yearly. The procedure is, 
first, estimate the yearly equation as: 
 
[A3.1]  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑦 = 𝛽0𝑦 + 𝛽𝑦𝑥𝑦 + 𝜀𝑦 
 
where 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑦  is the yearly GDP, 𝑥𝑦  is the yearly predictor of GDP which has an 
information in quarterly level (for example: an amount of M2 in economy), 𝛽0𝑦 is the 
constant term, 𝛽𝑦  is the correlation parameter of the yearly GDP to the yearly 
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predictor, and 𝜀 is the disturbance term. After obtaining the estimated value of 𝛽𝑦, the 
quarterly GDP can be predicted by equation below: 
 
[A3.2]  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑞 = 𝛽0𝑞 + 𝛽𝑦𝑥𝑞 + 𝜀𝑞, 
 
where 𝛽0𝑞 is the yearly constant term by quarter, 𝑥𝑞 is the quarterly predictor, and 𝜀𝑞 
is the disturbance term by quarter. In general, if the disturbance term satisfies the white 
noise condition, the 𝜀𝑞 is a value of  𝜀𝑦 divined by four. In this study, we would like 
to estimate the provincial GDP. Thus, instead of the quarterly level data, we use the 
provincial level data. First, the yearly GDP is used to estimate the correlation 
parameter with the predictor. Since there is no provincial data of M2, this study apply 
the non-food consumption, number of motorbike consumption in provincial level, as 
the predictor. After optaining the correlation parameter, the provincial GDP is 
predicted as: 
 
 [A3.3] 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝 = 𝛽0𝑝 + 𝛽𝑦𝑥𝑝 + 𝜀𝑝, 
 
where 𝛽0𝑝 is the yearly constant term by number of province, 𝑥𝑝 is the provincial non-
food consumption, and 𝜀𝑝 is the disturbance term by number of province. 
 The data use in predicting provincial GDP is 10 years which are from 1993 to 
1997, 2005, and 2010 to 2013. The estimated coefficient of the predictor is shown in 
the equation below: 
 
 [A3.4] 𝐺𝐷?̂?𝑦 = 62529.32 + 9215.918 𝑥𝑦. 
 
A unit of measurement is in 10,000. The coefficients are used to predict the provincial 
GDP as mention before.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
JOB CHARATERISTICS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SECONDARY 
STUDENTS DROPPING OUT FOR WORK: EVIDENCE FROM CHOICE 
EXPERIMENT IN LAONGARM DISTRICT, LAOS. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Human capital plays an important role in economic development. A higher 
education level increases labor productivity and consequently promotes production 
efficiency. Thus, governments and international organizations pay attention to 
educational development. However, although school enrollment has increased, the 
education sector still faces several problems in development and one of the most 
important problems is early school leaving or school dropout. In 2010, the number of 
global out-of-school children of primary and lower secondary age was 60.7 million 
and 70.6 million people, respectively. The number is the equivalent of 10 percent of 
all primary school children and 18 percent of lower secondary school children (UIS, 
2012). Of the total number of out-of-school children, 26 percent were students who 
dropped from school. The high rate of school dropout stows that even when more 
students are enrolled, they fail to stay in the system to complete their education. 
 School dropout can effect a child’s future social and economic status (Jencks 
et al., 1972; Winship and Korenman, 1999). Students who drop out from school have 
a limited choice in employment and a lower chance of being employed (Sum et al., 
2009; Rumberger, 1987). Although they can enter the labor market, they earn less than 
those who complete school (Levin et al., 2007). Moreover, other problems that 
dropout students face are, a difficulty receiving public assistance (Waldfogel et al., 
2007), health problems (Muennig, 2007), and even crime (Moretti, 2007). 
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Dropout from school is caused by several factors. Poverty is very important 
factor. Children from poor households tend to repeat or leave school early (Hunt, 
2008; Hammond et al., 2007; Sabates et al., 2010). Poor households might require 
children to drop out of school to work as a source of income. Some children need to 
work while they are studying and this increases the risk of them repeating and 
dropping out from school (UCW, 2010). Also, parents with low level education seem 
stress the importance of education less and make their children drop out from school 
(Hunt, 2008). Long distances to school with difficult transportation discourage 
households from sending their children of school (Hunt, 2008). 
In addition to these factors, the growth of employment in the labor market is 
the potential to increase school dropout. The growth increases wage levels and job 
availability which increases the opportunity cost of not working. Increasing wages in 
the labor market attract appropriate working age students (secondary students) to drop 
out from school and join the labor market. Moreover, students who do not do well in 
school or who have difficulty to access to school have a higher possibility to be pulled 
out of school. 
Studies show that employment opportunities pull students out of school and 
the characteristics of jobs can effect the student decision to drop out (McNeal, 1997; 
Bickel and Milton, 1983; Papagiannis et al., 1983; Greenberger and Steinberg 1986). 
Many previous studies which use individual level data examine the effect of the 
employment opportunities on the already dropped students. However, using this data 
does not allow us to fully examine students’ willingness to drop out for work. Because 
each student seems not to have equal information about jobs available, students’ 
decision would vary depend on how much they know about the jobs available. In other 
words, some students who want to drop out decide not to because they do not have 
enough information about jobs available. The information about employment such 
wage level, location, type, and so on can play an important role in  
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decision making. 
To overcome the problems discussed above, a choice experiment was applied 
in this research. In the experiment, information about hypothetical jobs was provided 
to secondary education students. We asked them about their willingness to accept a 
job. The experiment eliminated the knowledge gap between students because every 
student receives the same amount of job information before making a decision.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of employment 
opportunities and job characteristics on the possibility of secondary students to drop 
out of school and take the jobs. The specific objectives are: 
 
a. To investigate the impact of increasing wages on the probability to secondary 
students dropping out of school to work. 
b. To analyze the preference of secondary school students for specific characteristics 
of jobs. 
c. To identify the characteristics of secondary school students who are likely to drop 
out of school to take jobs. 
 
The site of our experiment was in Laongarm district of Saravan Province, Laos. 
Among East Asia and Pacific countries, Laos was one of the highest dropout rates and 
Laongarm district is a district with a very high dropout rate. The district is 
economically growing; however, the number of out-of-school children is high. Many 
secondary students who drop out of school, seek jobs in cities and even cross the 
border to work in Thailand. Thus, Laongarm is an ideal location for the experiment. 
This paper is organized as: Section II describes of the situation of school 
dropout in Laognarm and other districts in Saravan province. Section III is a literature 
review. An analytical framework, a development of attributes and levels of the choice 
51 
 
experiment, and econometric strategy are explained in Section IV. Section V discusses 
the findings and the conclusion is in Section VI. 
 
4.2. Saravan school dropout situation 
 
Saravan province is located in the Southern part of Laos. It has a border with 
Sawanakhet province to the North, Vietnam to the East, Champasak and Sekong 
provinces to the South, and Thailand to the West. It has an area of 10,691 square 
kilometers and a population of 362,836 in 2012. Totally, there are 14,398 poor 
households (24%) and 84,224 poor people (23%). It is composed of eight districts: 
Saravan (main district), Ta Oi, Toumlan, Lakonpheng, Vapi, Konxedon, Laongam, 
and Samouay.  
In 2012, Saravan province had the highest dropout rate from primary (15.0%) 
and lower secondary (14.9%) education in Laos. It is also ranked with the third highest 
upper secondary dropout rate (8.9%). The dropout rates at district level are shown in 
Table 4.1. The district with highest dropout rate in primary level is Lakhonepheng 
(18.7 percent) and in lower and upper secondary is Samuoi (30.2 percent and 32.7 
percent, respectively). Laongarm district had the dropout rate 15.3, 13.5, and 7.7 
percent in primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary, respectively.  
Although Laongarm does not have the highest dropout rate among districts, it 
has better road conditions to connect to other developed cities (for example Pakse 
city) that provide access to employment in other wealthier cities. Additionally, the 
main population urban areas are Lao people who can take job opportunities more 
easily than other ethnic people. Moreover, there are many young laborers from the 
district who cross the border to work in Thailand. 
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Table 4.1 –Dropout Rate by Districts of Saravan Province in 2012 
District Primary 
Lower 
Secondary  
Upper 
Secondary  
Share of Poor 
Households* 
Khongxedone 16.8 10.9 10.1 7 
Lakhonepheng 18.7 12.0 14.8 18 
Lao ngarm 15.3 13.5 7.7 22 
Samuoi 11.4 30.2 32.7 94 
Saravan 12.1 12.0 4.7 10 
Ta Oi 14.0 24.5 22.1 95 
Toomlarn 18.4 20.4 6.3 42 
Vapy 15.0 8.8 9.4 9 
Saravan province 15.0 14.9 8.9  
Source: Saravan Planning and Investment Division, Ministry of Planning and Investment, 
and Department of Statistics, Ministry of Education and Sports. *Share of poor households 
is in 2011. 
 
4.3. Literature review 
 
Factors that influence school dropout can be divided into push and pull factors 
(Bjerk, 2012). Dropout due to reasons such as health issues, moving house, difficulty 
accessing education, low performance in class, and so on are categorized as push 
factors. While, dropout to work for additional household income, supplement labor 
for household farm or household work, look after the family, and so on are categorized 
as pull factors. 
The expanding of employment opportunity directly effects the probability of 
secondary students dropping out through pull factors, particularly dropping out to 
work for extra income. When the economy is growing, businesses increase production, 
which increase investment and hire more labor. Usually, businesses hire cheap labor 
to minimize the cost of production, and if the jobs are unskilled such as work in 
restaurant, retail shops, and so on, secondary students, who are the appropriate age for 
working, have a possibility of being hired (Duncan, 1965). As demand for unskilled 
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and low-paid labor increases, secondary students have the opportunity to drop out for 
work. In addition, with the increasing income of households in big cities, rich 
households require unskilled and cheap labor for household work. Through family 
connection, secondary students are sometimes asked to drop out from school and seek 
the jobs in big cities. 
The effect of push factors on dropout decisions are enhanced by employment 
opportunities. Students who have a high probability to drop out, such as those from 
poor families, have difficulty accessing education, have no interest and perform badly 
in class, would decide to leave school more easily. Furthermore, working and studying 
at the same time increases the probability of dropping out (McNeal, 1997). 
Some studies show that information about job availability can effect a decision 
about schooling. A study in India of Jensen (2012) suggested that informing students 
and household about job opportunities can make a change of their decision. Jensen 
experimentally sent job recruiters to villages to inform them about available 
employment for highly educated female labor, then he found an increasing number of 
female children entered and stayed in school. In this study, the decision of students 
when the offered unskilled jobs are requiring no education is observed. 
 
4.4. Methodology 
 
4.4.1. Analytical framework 
 
 The student’s decision to drop out from school is dependent on the expected 
return and the cost of schooling. From adaption of Gertler and Glewwe (1990), let’s 
assume an expected utility function conditional on an expected return from education 
and a cost of schooling as: 
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[4.1] 𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑆, 𝐶) + 𝜖 
 
where S is an expected return on education after completing secondary education and 
C is the consumption possible. Now, let’s consider the case where a student continue 
to study, 
 
[4.2] 𝑈𝑠 = 𝑈(𝑆𝑠, 𝐶𝑠) + 𝜖𝑠 
 
where Ss is the expected return after completing secondary education and Cs is the 
consumption possible after incurring the cost for completing secondary education. 
The cost includes the direct and indirect costs. The direct costs are such things as a 
tuition fee, school travelling cost, school uniform and materials, etc.; while the indirect 
costs are the opportunity cost of being at school such as the forgone income of not 
earning.  Now let’s consider the case of the student who decide to drop out from school, 
 
[4.3] 𝑈𝑑 = 𝑈(𝑆𝑑, 𝐶𝑑) + 𝜖𝑑 
 
where Sd is the expected return from not completing (dropout) secondary education 
and Cd is the consumption possible from not completing secondary education. The 
expected return of completing secondary education (Ss) is generally greater than the 
expected return of not completing secondary education (Sd), and the consumption 
possible of completing secondary education (Cs) is generally lower than the 
consumption possible of not completing secondary education (Cd). 
In deciding whether to complete the secondary level, the expected utility 
maximization is 
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[4.4] 𝑈∗ = max (𝑈𝑠, 𝑈𝑑). 
 
Thus a student would choose to attend and complete secondary education if 𝑈𝑠  is 
higher than 𝑈𝑑, and drop out from secondary school if 𝑈𝑑 is greater than 𝑈𝑠 instead. 
 Increasing wages of available unskilled jobs in the labor market increases the 
opportunity cost of being at the secondary school. This would decreases the 
consumption possible after incurring the cost of secondary schooling (Cs) and 𝑈𝑑 is 
likely to exceed 𝑈𝑠 . Therefore, the student would decide to drop out from the 
secondary school. The choice of the students whether to complete or drop out from 
the secondary level allows us to observe the effect of jobs’ characteristics (for example 
increasing wages) on the decision to drop out for working. 
 
4.4.2. Development of attributes and levels and their combination in the 
alternative 
 
After a group discussion with heads of villages around the experiment site and 
a consideration of relevant literature, the attributes and levels of the choice experiment 
are selected as shown in Table 4.2. There are three attributes: wage levels, locations, 
and type of jobs. The wage levels are from 0.4 million Kip to 2 million Kip. The range 
of the wage is from very unskilled work to high-skilled work in the Laongarm district. 
The location of jobs includes three domestic cities (Laongarm district, Pakse district, 
and Vientiane capital) and one foreign country (Thailand). Laongarm district has the 
lowest development level but it is the residential city of the students in this experiment. 
Pakse is the closest district with a better development level than Laongarm and 
Vientiane capital is the farthest location but it is the most developed location in Laos. 
Thailand is the most developed location and closer to Laongam district than Vientiane 
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capital. However, to work in Thailand, the students need to migrate. The map of the 
location is shown in appendix 4.1. 
 
Table 4.2 – Characteristics of Offered Jobs 
Attributes Levels 
  
Wage in millions Kip 0.4, 0.8, 1.2, 1.5, 2. 
  
Locations 
1 = Laongam district 
2 = Pakse district 
3 = Vientiane capital 
4 = Thailand 
  
Type of jobs 
1 = Garment factory work,  
2 = Agriculture farming, 
3 = Selling in local shop, 
4 = Housework. 
  
Note: 1 USD ≈ 8000 Kip in 2013. 
 
The offered jobs in our experiment are for unskilled labor. They are for work 
in a garment factory, in an agricultural farm, in a retail shop, and in a house as 
housemaid. The jobs are modified from a study of McNeal (1997). The garment 
factory job represents the industrial sector, the agricultural farm is for the agricultural 
sector, and the retail shop and housework are for the service sector. 
 
4.4.4. Experiment design 
 
The basic idea of the experiment is to inform the secondary students about 
available jobs and to observe their willingness to take the jobs. The experiment was 
conducted in the Laongarm completed secondary school which is the biggest  
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secondary school, and is located in the center of Laongarm district.  We selected 
October 2013,    the opening period of the new school year, for the experiment; 
because, students usually come to school in October and are absent or drop out in later 
period.  
There were 11 enumerators in the experimental team who are students from 
Champasak University.   The enumerators randomly went to classrooms of every 
grade in the school and randomly selected secondary students to participate in the 
experiment. The enumerators interviewed students individually.    The students were 
informed that the team was working for the government and some private companies 
to examine the potential labor force for job recruitment.   Then the enumerators 
offered the students the hypothetical jobs and asked them if they would like to take 
the job.  
The levels of attributes were randomly selected to construct the offered job. 
The students were also informed that if they prefer and are willing to take the job, they 
have the opportunity to be recruited. Every student is offered two choices of job in 
order to increase the sample size. The example of questionnaire is shown in appendix 
4.2. 
The answers of the students can be explained as in Figure 4.1. After a job is 
offered to an student, if the student says that he/she wants to take the job, then the 
enumerator to ask when time that they want to start the job. There are two possible 
answers, first, he/she is available to start the job now and, second, he/she wants to 
start the job later. 
For those who cannot take the job immediately, it means that they might want 
to consider the jobs carefully (for example: consulting with their parents). This does 
not completely mean that they want to complete the education level before taking the 
jobs; because, if they said that they do not want the jobs, there will be no jobs for them 
after completion of secondary education. 
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Figure 4.1 – Experiment Procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the student want the job now, it means the characteristics of the student can 
highly motivate the student to drop out and, or, the attributes of the job can highly 
attract the student out of school for work. If the student want to take the job but not 
immediately, then the effect of both characters of student and the job has some 
influence. And if the student does not want the job, the characters of the student and, 
or, the attributes of the job do not increase the probability of school dropout. In order 
to separate the effect of the characteristics of students and the attributes of the job, an 
econometric equation is used as shown in the next section. 
 
4.4.5. Econometric estimation 
 
 The student’s decision is used as the dependent variable in the econometric 
equation [4.5] below: 
Offer opportunity for 
available job 
Yes, respondent 
want to take the job 
No, respondent don’t 
want to take the job 
Want to take the job 
immediately 
Want to take the job 
but not immediately 
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[4.5] 𝑃(𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟)  =  𝑓(𝑿, 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑳, 𝑻), 
 
where  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟  indicate if individual student want to take the offered job, X is a vector 
of students’ characteristics, 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 is the wage level, L is a vector of location variables, 
and T is a vector that include the types job variables.  
There are two types of the dependent variable. The first is a binary variable 
which equal to one if an individual student prefers the offered job and zero for 
otherwise. The second type is a rank of probability to take the offered job which equal 
to one if the individual student does not prefer the offered job, equal to two for prefer 
to job but not immediately, and equal to three for prefer the job for working now. Thus 
the equation is estimated by the logit model for the binary type and the ordered logit 
for the ranking type. The coefficients reported in the results are also shown in an odd 
ratio form. After that, the estimated coefficients from logit model are used for 
calculation of the average willingness to accept by diving the estimated coefficients 
of students’ characteristics and jobs’ attributes to the estimated coefficient of the wage 
variable. 
Table 4.3 explains a definition and hypothesized sign of variables. The 
variables of students’ characteristics are gender, ethnicity, household member, 
knowledge on working outside of district, level of household’s income, and difficulty 
in access to school. The gender (Female) is a binary variable which equal to one if the 
student is female and zero for otherwise. It does not seem to influence on the decision 
to take the offered job. For ethnicity, the variable of Lao is used to divide students 
into Lao and non-Lao groups. The Lao group students are expected to have a lower 
possibility to take job. Because many government and high occupation status staffs, 
who are required to have high education level, are usually Lao persons; thus, Lao 
students seem to have a better knowledge on the return to education. The household 
member (HHmember) is expected to have no effect on the decision to take the job. On 
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one hand, having many members might require students to be an additional income 
source, thus they might want to drop out for work. On the other hand, having many 
members can means that there is a sufficient number of earner, thus students would 
not want to drop out for work. 
The knowledge of working outside Laongarm (Knowofwork) is measured by 
asking the students if they have friends working outside of Laongarm. By knowing 
friends working outside of the district, it provides an example to the student and 
increases the possibility of the student to take the job. For the household income 
(HHincome), this study uses a proxy because students cannot provide a reliable 
information about their household’s income. Thus, we asked students for the main 
material of their house. It is measured as if the material is a concrete or cheaper 
material. Students from a concrete house are assumed to come from richer family who 
would not want to drop school for work. Walking or riding bicycle and motorbike is 
used as a proxy to indicate the difficulty for traveling to school (Walkschool). If the 
students walk to school, they might find it difficult to come to school and want to drop 
from school and take the job comparing with the students who travel to school by 
bicycle, motorbike, and someone sending to school. 
The wage variable has five levels. The location variables in a vector L are 
Pakse, Vientiane, and Thailand which represent of Pakse district, Vientiane capital, 
and Thailand, respectively. Laongarm district is used as a referent group. The job in 
Laongarm is expected to be the most preferred, followed by jobs in Pakse, Vientiane 
Capital, and Thailand due to the difficulty in travelling back to Laongarm. The jobs 
in a vector T are the work in garment factory (Garment), selling in local shop (Selling), 
and housework (Housework). The working in farm is a comparison group. The least 
preference job is expected to be the work on farm because it require hard labor. The 
following preferred jobs are in the garment factory, housework, and selling in local 
shop. 
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Table 4.3 – Variable Definition and Hypothesized sign 
Variable  Definition Hypothesized sign 
   
Students’ characteristics 
Female 1 = female, 0 = otherwise +/– 
Lao 1 = Lao ethnic student, 0 = otherwise – 
HHmember Number of household member +/– 
HHincome 
1 = if a main material of house is concrete, 0 = 
otherwise 
– 
Knowofwork 
1 = if friends work outside Laongarm, 0 = 
otherwise 
+ 
Walkschool 
1 = if the student walk to school, 0 = 
otherwise 
+ 
   
Job’s attributes 
Wage 5 levels from 0.4 to 2 million Kip + 
Pakse 1 = job in Pakse district, 0 = otherwise – 
Vientiane 1 = job in Vientiane capital, 0 = otherwise – 
Thailand 1 = job in Thailand, 0 = otherwise – 
Garment 1 = work for garment factories, 0 = otherwise + 
Selling 1 = work for local shop, 0 = otherwise + 
Housework 1 = work as housemate, 0 = otherwise + 
   
 
 
4.5. Data 
 
 Table 4.4 shows the data description. The total sample size after data cleaning 
is 133 students. Because each student answers two choices, the total observation is 
266. The data description is in Table 4.3. Of the sample, 56 percent are female students 
and 91 percent are Lao ethnic students. On average, students are from a household 
size of six people. Thirteen percent of students report that they have friends who are 
currently working outside of the district. About 38 percent of students say their house 
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is of concrete construction. Half of all students walk to school and another half mainly 
use bicycles or motorbikes. 
 
Table 4.4 – Data Description 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
Students’ characteristics 
Female 0.56 0.49 0 1 
Lao 0.91 0.28 0 1 
HHmember 6.10 2.00 3 12 
HHincome 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Knowofwork 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Walkschool 0.50 0.50 0 1 
     
Job’s attributes 
Wage 1.09 0.48 0.4 2 
Pakse 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Vientiane 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Thailand 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Garment 0.23 0.43 0 1 
Selling 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Housework 0.26 0.44 0 1 
     
 
 
4.6. Results and discussion 
 
4.6.1. Interest of job offer 
 
Figure 4.2 is Figure 4.1 with the number of students who answered each 
category added to the diagram. Of 133 students, 42 students answered that they are 
interested in the jobs. Three students said that they could take the jobs immediately. 
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The figure shows that 31.5% of the total sample are interested in the job offer and 
about 2.2% would drop out of school to take the job immediately. 
 
Figure 4.2 – Answer of Students 
 
 
 
               (3 students) 
                            (42 students) 
 
 
                 (39 students) 
             (91 students) 
 
 
4.6.2. Equation estimation result 
  
The results from the equation [4.5] are shown in Table 4.5. The results are 
reported in coefficient of the logit, odd ratio of the logit, coefficient of the ordered 
logit, and odd ratio of orders logit, from left to right respectively. The Pseudo R-
squared of the logit is 0.12 and of the ordered logit is 0.11. 
Overall, several variables have the expected sign. The Female variable has a 
positive sign but is statistically insignificant. However, although the variable is not 
statistically significant, its impact is seemingly large. An odd ratio shows that female 
students are 1.51 times more likely to take the jobs than male students.  The variable 
Lao has the expected negative sign but it is statistically significant only in the ordered 
logit estimation. This shows that Lao ethnicity students are less likely to 
Yes, respondent 
want to take the job 
Offer opportunity for 
available job 
Want to take the job 
immediately 
Want to take the job 
but not immediately 
No, respondent don’t 
want to take the job 
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Table 4.5 – Estimation Results 
 Logit Ordered logit 
Variable Coefficient Odd ratio Coefficient Odd ratio 
     
Female 0.412 1.510 0.349 1.419 
 (1.326)  (1.133)  
Lao -0.770 0.463 -0.883* 0.413 
 (-1.526)  (-1.766)  
HHmember -0.054 0.947 -0.041 0.959 
 (-0.704)  (-0.541)  
HHincome -1.020*** 0.361 -0.998*** 0.368 
 (-2.934)  (-2.886)  
Knowofwork 0.854** 2.351 0.917** 2.502 
 (2.023)  (2.200)  
Walkschool 0.586* 1.797 0.658** 1.932 
 (1.885)  (2.123)  
Wage 0.538* 1.714 0.556* 1.745 
 (1.691)  (1.753)  
Pakse -0.633 0.531 -0.670* 0.511 
 (-1.550)  (-1.653)  
Vientiane -0.667 0.513 -0.758* 0.469 
 (-1.615)  (-1.852)  
Thailand -1.125** 0.325 -1.176*** 0.308 
 (-2.486)  (-2.632)  
Garment -0.571 0.565 -0.471 0.624 
 (-1.370)  (-1.154)  
Selling -0.138 0.871 -0.118 0.888 
 (-0.329)  (-0.284)  
Housework -0.649 0.522 -0.656 0.518 
 (-1.577)  (-1.608)  
     
Constant -0.006 0.993   
 (-0.008)    
Constant cut 1   0.004 1.005 
   (0.005)  
Constant cut 2   3.286*** 26.742 
   (3.546)  
     
Chi-squared 38.2 40.4 
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.11 
Observation 266 266 
Note: z-statistics are in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Both 
equations control for the second choice. 
65 
 
drop out for work. The number of people in household cannot explain the likelihood 
of secondary students to take the offered jobs. The HHmember is not statistically 
significant in both logit and ordered logit estimations.  
The household wealth level has a significant effect on the decision of the 
secondary students to take the jobs. Both the logit and ordered logit show the expected 
negative sign of the HHincome variable. The odd ratio illustrates that students from 
rich households (main material of house is concrete) have the probability to accept the 
jobs 0.36 times the students from poor households (main material of house is poorer 
condition than concrete). 
The Knowofwork variable has the expected sign and is statistically significant. 
Interestingly, the Knowofwork has a large impact on the secondary students’ decision. 
The odd ratio of Knowofwork shows that the students who have friends working 
outside Laongarm district are 2.35 times more likely to drop out than students who do 
not have. The difficulty in travelling to school is also important for the secondary 
students’ decision. The variable of Walkschool has the expected positive sign and is 
statistically significant. Students who walk to school are 1.80 times more likely to take 
the offered jobs than students who travel to school by bicycles or motorbikes. 
In the jobs’ attributes, the variable of wage has the expected positive sign and 
is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This confirms the possibility that a 
higher level of wage can draw secondary students out of school and into work. 
Regarding location of jobs, students are less likely to take jobs that are distant from 
the Laongarm district. Every location variable is statistically significant in the ordered 
logit estimation but only the variable Thailand is statistically significant in the logit 
estimation. This result is interesting because it shows that students prefer to work in a 
location closer to their home town. Thus, several secondary school age children move 
to work in developed locations such as Vientiane Capital and Thailand because there 
is a higher level of wages. For the type of jobs, all variables have a positive sign but 
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are statistically insignificant. The result shows that students have an equal preference 
for every type of job. 
 
4.6.3. Willingness to accept work 
 
Table 4.6 shows the willingness to accept the offered jobs in monetary term 
for variables that are statistically significant at the 10 percent level (for either logit or 
ordered logit estimation). The willingness to accept value is reported in million Kip 
and USD units; however, for simplicity, the values in USD are used for interpretation.  
 
Table 4.6 – Willingness to Accept Offered Jobs 
Variable 
Value in millions 
Kip 
Value in USD 
   
Average WTA for taking the offered job 3.22 403 
   
Student’s characteristics   
Lao 1.43 179 
HHincome 1.89 237 
Knowofwork -1.59 -198 
Walkschool -1.09 -136 
   
Job’s attributes   
Pakse 1.18 147 
Vientiane 1.24 154 
Thailand 2.09 261 
   
Note: 1 USD = 8000 Kip 
 
The average willingness to accept the offered job is 403 USD. The Lao 
ethnicity students prefer 179 USD higher wage than non-Lao ethnicity students. The 
students from rich household would accept the jobs with 237 USD higher than 
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students from poorer household. The variable of Knowofwork and Walkschool have a 
negative value which mean that students who have friends working outside of 
Laongarm and need to walk to school would accept the jobs with lower wage of 198 
USD and 136 USD than the students who do not have friends working outside 
Laongarm district and ride bikes to school, respectively. If the students need to go out 
of Laongarm district to work in Pakse city, Vientiane capital, and Thailand, they prefer 
147, 154, and 261 USD, respectively. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
School dropout lowers the future socio-economic outcome of students. The 
school dropout is caused by several reasons. One of the most important factors is the 
employment availability in the labor market. An increasing wage and employment 
expansion pull students, particularly secondary students who have an appropriate 
working age, out of schools by increasing the opportunity cost for not working. Thus, 
the main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of the characteristics of jobs 
on the possibility of secondary students to drop out from school. 
Many previous studies investigated the impact of job’s characteristics on the 
secondary students’ decision to drop out by using the data of the already dropped 
students. However, some students might not drop out of school because of lack of 
knowledge about employment. Therefore, the studies did not show the precise effect 
of the job’s characteristics on all students. This study employs the discrete choice 
experiment to address the problem. In the experiment, the students were provided an 
information of hypothetical jobs. Then, the answer of students on willingness to accept 
the job would show the potential dropout. The experiment equalizes students’ 
knowledge about job. 
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The experiment was conducted at October 2013 in the Laongarm complete 
secondary school in Laongarm district, Laos. There are three attributes in the choice 
set. The first attribute is the wage which includes five levels. The second attribute is 
the location of job which have four levels (within Laongarm district, Pakse district, 
Vientiane capital, and Thailand). The third attribute is the type of job which includes 
farming, shop retailing, working in garment factory, and doing housework. The levels 
of attributes are randomly selected to construct each alternative. 
From 133 students who participate in the experiment, there are 42 students 
answered that they want to take the offered jobs and three students can take the jobs 
immediately. The number of students who are interested in the jobs show the potential 
of dropping out. The results from the econometric analysis shows that Lao ethnicity 
students have a lower possibility to drop out and take the offered jobs. If the students 
are from rich household, they would have lower probability to drop out for the jobs. 
The students also have higher chance to take the jobs if they have friends who are 
working outside of the Laongarm district. This shows that the information about 
working can play an important role in taking jobs. Another important factor is the 
travelling from house to school. If the students walk to school, they have higher 
possibility to take the jobs more than students who use bicycle or motorbike in 
travelling to school. 
In the characteristics of job, an increasing wage can attract the students to take 
the jobs. This shows the probability of the secondary students to drop out and take the 
jobs. For location of jobs, if the jobs are located in farther place from the Laongarm 
district, the students are less likely to take the jobs. The highest level of WTA for 
location is for Thailand. For the type of jobs, there is no statistical significance among 
working in farm, retail shop, garment factory, and as housework. 
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Appendix 4.1. Map of location 
 
Figure A.4.1. Map of Location of the Offered Jobs 
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Appendix 4.2. Example of questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire for potential labor 
We are a group of researchers from the National University of Laos cooperated with 
companies which would like to search for potential labor in Laongarm district. Your 
answer would be kept as secrete and would not have any effect on you. Thus, please 
answer the question below correctly. 
No.  No. of questionnaire     
Village   
Interviewer   
Name Name and surname     
Phone Telephone number     
  Question Way to answer Answer 
p3q1 Sex 1 = male. 2 female.   
p3q2 Grade level     
p3q3 Ethnicity     
p3q4 Household member     
p3q5 Sibling member     
p3q6 Number of household member who work outside of district   
p3q7 Number of household member who work in Thailand   
p3q8 
Do you have friends 
working outside of 
district? 
1 = yes, 2 no 
  
p3q9 
Who are you 
currently living with? 
1 = farther and mother, 2 = farther, 3 = 
mother, 4 = other.   
p3q10 
Occupation of your 
parent 
1 = agriculture, 2 = retailer, 3 = employee, 
4 = government, 5 = teacher, 7 = 
unemployed, household and farm work, 
other = please indicate   
p3q11 Parent's education 
0 = illiteracy, educated = indicate,  
9 = do not know.   
p3q12 
Does your house 
access to electricity 1 = yes, 2 no   
p3q13 Number of car Number   
p3q14 Number of motorbike Number   
p3q15 Tractor Number   
p3q16 
Number of castle 
Cow   
p3q17 Buffalo   
p3q18 Poultry   
p3q19 
Material of house's 
walls 1 = woods, 3 = concrete, 4 = other   
p3q20 Travel to school 
1 = walk, 2 = bicycle, 3 = someone send 
to school, 4 = motorbike, other = please 
indicate   
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p3q21 How many minutes do you spend to travel to school?   
p3q22 
Total score of last 
glade 
9 = do not remember,  
other = please indicate   
p3q23 How many time have you repeat glade?   
p3q24 
How often do you 
skip your class? 
0 = never, 1 = few, 2 = half,  
3 = half of total class   
 
If companies offer a job as show below, would you accept it? 
p3q25 
Would you like to take this job? 
Location Vientiane 
p3q26 Type of job On farm 
p3q27 Salary 1,000,000 
p3q28 1 = accept, 2 = do not accept.  
p3q29 
If you accept the job, when 
would you take the job? 
1 = immediately, other = 
please indicate  
If companies offer a job as show below, would you accept it? 
p3q30 
Would you like to take this job? 
Location Thailand 
p3q31 Type of job Garment factory 
p3q32 Salary 1,500,000 
p3q33 1 = accept, 2 = do not accept.   
p3q34 
If you accept the job, when 
would you take the job? 
1 = immediately, other = 
please indicate   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
VALUATION OF INCENTIVE TO RECRUIT TEACHERS IN 
RURAL SCHOOL AND PREVENT THEM FROM LEAVING 
PROFESSION: EVIDENCE FROM CHOICE EXPERIMENT IN 
CAMBODIA AND LAOS 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
After decades of educational development such as the universal primary 
education goal of the Millennium Development Goals and the Education for All 
program, international organizations and governments have been focusing on school 
enrollment. As a result, the number of enrolled students has increased consistently. 
The global net enrollment ratio of primary and secondary education has increased 
from 82.9 percent and 52.9 percent in 2000 to 89.3 percent and 62.7 percent in 2011, 
respectively (World Bank, 2014). Also the gross enrollment ratio has risen from 34.3 
percent, 99.3 percent, and 60 percent for pre-primary, primary, and secondary levels 
in 2000 to 50.1 percent, 107.1 percent, and 70.6 percent in 2011, respectively. This 
increase shows the need to provide corresponding educational resource, particularly 
teachers. 
Increase number of teacher can promote quality of education. More number of 
teacher reduces a pupil-teacher ratio which increases students’ performance (Angrist 
and Lavy, 1999) and future earning (Card and Krueger, 1992). In addition, recruiting 
qualified and academically talented teachers enhance the quality of teaching and 
improve learning outcome (Hanushek and Rivkin 2010; McKenzie et al., 2005). The 
development of education quality can promote economic growth (Hanushek and 
Woessmann 2007). A number of studies have examined the factors that influence a 
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teacher’s decision to join the teaching profession (Rots et al., 2014; Gunnduz; 2014; 
Skaalvik and Skaalvik, 2011; Stinebrickner, 2002; Yong, 1995; Chivore, 1988). 
Studies have reviewed the factors that influence potential teachers not to join 
the teaching profession. The salary and benefit are regarded as the most important 
factors. High salaries motivate potential teachers to join the teaching profession 
(Figlio 1997; Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 1999; Barber, Mourshed, and Whelen, 
2007; Leigh 2009). Also, the living and working conditions are very important. 
Remoteness of villages and poor working conditions of school discourage potential 
teachers from taking teaching jobs (McEwan, 1999; Kelly et al., 1981; Chapman and 
Hutcheson, 1982; Heyns, 1988; Lortie, 1975). Furthermore, increasing benefits of 
non-teaching jobs can also attract the potential teacher to leave teaching. The potential 
teachers are very keen to compare salaries in teaching jobs to non-teaching jobs (Boyd 
et al., 2006; Wolter and Denzler, 2003; Dolton, 1990). Unlike other civil servants such 
as doctors, polices, soldiers, etc.; graduates with teaching certificates seem to adapt 
more easily to other jobs in the labor market. 
In order to encourage potential teachers to join and keep teachers in the 
teaching profession, governments of many countries provide incentive programs to 
increase benefits in the teaching profession. Increasing financial support such as 
raising salaries and allowances and indirect monetary incentives such as housing, 
transportation, continued education, promotion, and so on are common used in many 
countries. (Urquiola and Vegas, 2005; McEwan, 1998; ILO, 1991; Carnoy and Torres, 
1994; Lockheed and Verspoor, 1991; Dove, 1986). 
To provide an appropriate incentive, the important questions are “how much 
should we pay?” and “which factors influence potential teacher’s decision the most?”. 
In practice, it is very difficult to estimate the price of these factors because of an 
absence of a market. Many previous studies value and measure the important of 
factors by simply asking teachers to rank their level of satisfaction on each factor one 
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by one. However, such procedure cannot give a value in monetary term and does not 
provide a precise ranking because factors does not appear the same time for 
comparison. To address such problem, this study employs a discrete choice 
experiment (DCE) analysis. In DCE, we can introduce several factors in same choice 
set, then teachers can compare and select the most important factor. The DCE is a 
well-known tool for estimating a non-market value in many research fields. Using 
DCE to analyze a professional participation is widely practiced in health economics 
(Li et al., 2014; Vujicic et al. 2010; Lin, 2014; Scott, 2013). However, it is still rare 
to see researches that apply DEC to analyze potential teacher’s preference (see Burke 
et al., 2015). Therefore, the main of objective of present research is to value the factors 
that discourage and encourage potential teacher’s decision on joining the service. The 
specific objectives are: 
 
a. To value the characteristics of rural location of school and conditions of 
classrooms 
b. To estimate the preference of non-teaching jobs 
c. To value indirect monetary incentive programs 
d. To compare the estimated WTA to actual market of non-teaching jobs for 
possibility of not joining. 
 
The sample is teacher trainees in Cambodia and Laos. They are potential 
teachers for primary and lower secondary level. Using data from current trainees 
rather than actual teachers provides an opportunity to examine a general preference of 
all teachers, who might and might not join the teaching profession. Cambodia and 
Laos have a high number of out of school children among the East Asia and Pacific 
countries (UIS, 2012). Both countries have high economic growth and increasing 
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salary in the labor market. The high salaries of the non-teaching profession indicate a 
high opportunity cost for the teaching profession. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II explains the 
current situation of teachers in Cambodia and Laos. Section III is a review of relevant 
literature. The methodology is discussed in Section IV, which includes an analytical 
framework, a development of attributes and levels, and econometric equations. Data 
collection and description are explained in Section V. Section VI discusses the results. 
Section VII is the final conclusion. 
 
5.2. Teachers in Cambodia and Laos 
 
In both Cambodia and Laos, primary to lower secondary teachers are expected 
to graduate from teacher training college, while upper secondary school teachers are 
expected to study up to from university level. Usually, trainees who enroll in teacher 
training college are from households with poor socio-economic backgrounds and 
cannot enroll in university (MoE, 2006; Nock and Bishop, 2008). Some trainees enroll 
in the teacher training college through village or regional quotas and some need to 
take an entrance exam.  However, trainees who can enter teacher training are likely to 
come from urban areas and do not select teaching as their first choice (MoE, 2006). 
Thus there is the probability that they will leave teaching. 
 Figure 5.1 illustrates the number of teachers from 2006/07 to 2012/13 in 
Cambodia and Laos. In general, the number of teachers in Cambodia was higher than 
in Laos for both primary and secondary levels. Also there are more teachers in primary 
level than in secondary level because there are more classes. The number of teachers 
in Cambodian primary education slightly decreased from 2007/08 to 2009/10 and then 
remained constant. In contrast, the number of Lao primary teachers increased 
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continuously. The quantity of secondary teachers increased consistently over the 
period in both countries.  
Although, the number of teachers in Cambodia was greater than in Laos, Lao 
pupil teacher ratio was lower than in Cambodia. Figure 5.2 presents the pupil teacher 
ratio from 2006/2007 to 2012/2013. In general, the ratios have a decreasing trend. The 
ratio in Cambodia decreased from 36.1 students per teacher in 2006/07 to 29.7 in 
2012/13; while in Laos, it decrease from 28.7 in 2006/07 to 22.0 in 2012/13. 
There are several common problems in Cambodia and Laos. The most 
important of which are low level of teacher salaries and delay of payment (Tandon 
and Fukao, 2012; Benvebiste et al., 2008). Teacher salaries are insufficient to cover 
basic living cost, especially for families. Tandon and Fukao (2012) show that teacher 
earnings are generally lower than other professions in Cambodia. They also state that 
many potential teachers decide to enter the teaching profession because of its 
respectability, importance in society, and job security. 
 
Figure 5.1 – Total Number of Teacher in Cambodia and Laos 
 
Source: EMIS, 2012 and MoES, 2012. Note: the unit is in 1000 teachers. 
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Figure 5.2 – Pupil Teacher Ratio in Cambodia and Laos 
 
Source: EMIS, 2012 and MoES, 2012. 
 
  Due to the low level and delay in salary payment, some teachers need to take 
additional jobs to secure their income (Benvebiste et al., 2008; WB and MoE, 2008). 
These jobs are usually farming or other work in the village. This shows a likelihood 
of moving to non-teaching jobs when the opportunity cost of teaching is high. Studies 
on incentive programs in Cambodia show that incentive programs, especially financial 
support, can increase teacher motivation and satisfaction (Nock and Bishop, 2008; 
Benvebiste et al., 2008). The governments in both countries provide incentive 
programs to compensate teachers. However, the actual amount of incentive is small 
and does not seem to attract good and qualified teachers. 
 
5.3. Literature review 
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5.3.1. Remoteness, workplace, and non-teaching jobs 
 
 One of the earliest papers that clarifies the influences on teacher’s decision is 
by Chapman (1983). The factors are categorized into personal characteristics, training 
and primary teaching experience, professional and social influences, and career 
satisfaction. Ingersoll (2002) also mentions similar factors which are family or 
personal reasons, school staffing actions, pursuing another job, and dissatisfaction 
with the job and workplace. 
After teacher training school, some trainees are assigned to teach in schools 
located in rural villages. Teaching in rural areas isolate them from social life, expose 
them to security risks, and has difficult living conditions (ILO, 1991; Lockheed and 
Verspoor, 1991; Murnane, 1993). The remoteness of villages reduces teachers’ 
willingness to teach (McEwan, 1999). Usually, infrastructure such as hospitals, mains 
water, electricity, and regular markets are absent from rural villages. Thus, rural 
schools usually can attract only teachers with a lower formal education level, lack of 
experience, and insufficient skills in specific subjects (Psacharopoulos et al., 1993; 
McEwan, 1999).  
Additionally, the condition of school is also important for teacher’s decision. 
Teaching is effected by the condition of working place (Vegas, 2005). The teacher’s 
satisfaction for job is related to enthusiasm and decision to remain teaching (Kelly et 
al., 1981; Chapman and Hutcheson, 1982; Heyns, 1988; Lortie, 1975) and poor 
working condition (for example: lack of equipment and facility for teaching) is one of 
the main influential factors on teacher’s satisfaction (Buckley, Schneider, and Shang, 
2005). Also, teacher usually prefers a class with fewer number of students (Theobald, 
1990). 
 Sufficient financial support is very important for keeping teacher. Many 
studies point out that a low pay can pushes teacher to leave teaching (Ingersoll, 2000; 
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Liu and Meyer, 2005; Macdonald, 1995; Stinebrickner, 2001; Tye and O’Brien, 2002). 
Murnane et al. (1989) demonstrates that the higher paid teachers tend to keep teaching 
longer than the lower paid teachers. Similarly, study of Ingersoll (2002) also suggests 
that the main factor for leaving is the low salaries. Kersaint et al. (2007) found that 
teachers who left teaching usually care more about financial benefit than teachers who 
remained teaching. Pursuing other careers with higher salary and other benefits is the 
most relevant reason for teacher to leave (NCES, 1997). An increasing benefit of non-
teaching job increases the opportunity cost for teaching. When the opportunity cost is 
very high, teacher would not join and leave the system (Rogers and Vegas, 2010). 
The factors that influence teaching decision effects teacher differently depend 
on their characteristics. The personal characteristics like age, gender, ethnicity, 
marital status, socio-economic status, and degree of profession play a significant role 
in teacher’s decision (Chapman, 1983; Heyns, 1988; Lortie, 1975). For example, new 
teachers usually start working when they are young and single, and after they are 
married and have more family member, they have a possibility to change their job for 
a sufficient income issue (Stinebrickner, 2002). In other words, the decision to remain 
teaching is often related to family situation. Particularly for female teachers because 
usually they need to take care of household works and children. Study of Kersaint et 
al. (2007) states that times spend with family and responsibility for family are highly 
concerned in the leaving decision. 
 
5.3.2. Teacher incentive 
 
 Effective incentives result in better quality and more teaching in the education 
service. Different types of incentive programs are used to motivate teachers to teach 
in rural areas, to retain teachers, and to recruit qualified teachers.  
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They can be divided into non-monetary and monetary incentives (Kemmerer, 1990). 
Non-monetary incentives are common tools for the government when it has an 
insufficient budget. There are things such as social status, recognition, higher 
positions, and approval from very important people, etc. The monetary incentives can 
be separated into direct and indirect incentives. The direct monetary incentives are 
things such as an increasing salary, allowance, etc.; while the indirect incentives are 
things such as special training, materials for teaching, instructional supervision, and 
support for housing, transportation, etc. 
Jones (2013) examines performance pay by asking teachers how long they 
would continue teaching. The results show that teachers with a pay incentive say they 
are less likely to leave than teachers without the incentive. Moreover, Stevenson et al. 
(1999) show that the increasing salary and bonus incentives increase the number of 
potential teachers; but to ensure the retention, an effective quality teaching 
environment are necessary. 
Incentive programs are adapted by the education system of many countries. 
Urquiola and Vegas (2005) studied financial incentives in Bolivia, which increased 
the salary, and concluded that the incentive is not effective in attracting suitable 
teachers to rural area. They reveal that the increase in salary is too small to have an 
impact. In developing countries, recruitment policies such as increasing salary, bonus, 
housing, and training are frequently practiced (ILO, 1991; Carnoy and Torres, 1994; 
Lockheed and Verspoor, 1991; McEwan, 1998; Dove, 1986). The bonus and payment 
incentives are found in countries such as Argentina, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Philippines, 
etc. Venezuela uses the condition of time spent in rural areas to increase salaries. 
Honduras accepts three years of rural service as the equivalent of five years regular 
service in their seniority calculation. Moreover, other forms of benefit such as housing 
support are also found in many countries. Free housing is provided in Iraq, Mexico 
reduces house rent, and Senegal affords a housing allowance. For indirect-monetary 
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incentives, Bangladesh provides a special training for teachers in rural areas; and in 
Guyana, rural teachers get quicker promotion (ILO, 1991). 
Additionally, some studies investigate the effect of incentives on educational 
outcome. Duflo et al. (2007) found that teacher absenteeism in rural India can be 
decreased by monitoring and salary incentives. Another study of Mizala and 
Romaguera (2005) suggests that student outcome can be improved by increasing the 
level of teacher salaries. Additionally, students in Mexico perform better in secondary 
education when their teachers receive monetary incentives (McEwan and Santibanes, 
2005; Santibanes et al., 2007). 
 
5.4. Methodology 
 
5.4.1. Analytical framework 
 
The decision of a potential teacher to join the teaching profession is dependent 
on the benefits and workplace environment of teaching profession compare to other 
professions. Let’s assume an expected utility of the potential teacher conditional on 
joining the teaching profession as: 
 
[5.1] 𝑈𝑡 = 𝑈(𝑊𝑡, 𝐸𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡  
 
where 𝑊𝑡  and 𝐸𝑡  are the benefits and workplace environment of the teaching 
profession, respectively. The benefits include direct benefits such as salary and other 
financial support, and indirect benefits such as social status, etc. The workplace 
environment (E) measures things such as development of infrastructures, etc. 𝜖𝑡 is a 
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W 
E 
disturbance term. 𝑊𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡 are assumed to have a positive effect on the expected 
utility, thus they are compensated as shown in the indifference curve in Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3 – Indifference Curve for Teaching 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Created by author. 
 
 Point a and b in Figure 5.3 lie along the same indifferent curve which mean 
that both points result the same utility level. Point a has a better environment of 
workplace than point b but a lower level of benefit. If we compare from point a as an 
initial point and to point b as a final, we can see that a change in the environment of 
workplace (△E) is equivalent to the change in benefit (△W). In other words, teachers 
who need to teach at the poorer environment of work place as △E should be 
compensated of the higher benefit as △W. The aim of this study is to categorize the 
poor workplace environment and estimate the compensation of benefit in monetary 
term. 
Now let’s consider the possibility of not joining the teaching profession or 
deciding to join other professions. The expected utility for joining another profession 
is: 
a 
b 
△W 
△E 
Wb 
Wa 
Eb Ea 
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[5.2] 𝑈𝑜 = 𝑈(𝑊𝑜 , 𝐸𝑜) + 𝜖𝑜 
 
From [5.1] and [5.2], the unconditional utility maximization problem is: 
 
[5.3] 𝑈∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑈𝑡, 𝑈𝑜). 
 
From the maximization problem, the potential teacher would choose to join 
the teaching profession if the expected utility of working as a teacher (Ut) is greater 
than the expected utility for joining another profession (Uo) and vice versa. Let’s 
consider cases of W and E that effect the decision of potential teachers. 
 
[5.4] 𝑊𝑡 > 𝑊𝑜 and 𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸𝑜  → potential teacher to join 
 
[5.5] 𝑊𝑡 < 𝑊𝑜 and 𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸𝑜  → potential teacher not to join  
(non-teaching jobs effect) 
 
[5.6] 𝑊𝑡 = 𝑊𝑜 and 𝐸𝑡 > 𝐸𝑜  → potential teacher to join 
 
[5.7] 𝑊𝑡 = 𝑊𝑜 and 𝐸𝑡 < 𝐸𝑜  → potential teacher not to join  
(workplace environment effect). 
 
The potential teacher will join the teaching profession if there is a greater 
benefit or a better workplace environment as shown in [5.4] and [5.6]. In contrast, if 
the environment of both professions is same and the benefit of the other profession is 
greater than the benefit in the teaching profession, the potential teacher will not join 
the teaching profession. The decision not to join is caused by the non-teaching job 
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effect [5.5]. Also, if the benefit is equal in both professions but the workplace 
environment of the teaching job is lower than the environment in the other profession, 
the potential teacher will not become a teacher. The decision not to join is caused by 
the poor workplace environment effect [5.7].  
 
5.4.2. Development of attributes and levels 
 
There are four choice experiments which are the rural location of schools, 
classroom conditions, preference for non-teaching jobs, and indirect monetary 
incentive programs. Attributes and levels in alternatives of each experiment are listed 
in Table 5.1. They are designated after considering the relevant literatures and focus 
group discussions of the educational specialists. Some of the attributes and levels were 
tested at a pilot survey in Laos, then modified and used in the actual survey. 
 Every choice sets include attributes of salary level for estimating the 
willingness to accept teaching in monetary terms. There are three levels of salaries for 
each country, 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 million Riel for Cambodia and 1, 2, and 3 million 
Kip for Laos. The level of salaries is taken from levels of above and below a regular 
teacher salaries in both countries. There are six attributes for the choice experiment of 
the rural location of schools; which are the salary levels, travel times to closest town, 
electricity, mains water supply, hospitals, and regular markets. For the experiment of 
classroom, there are four attributes which are salary levels, material of classroom floor, 
number of pupils per class, and ethnicity of pupils. The experiment for non-teaching 
jobs includes the salary levels and types of jobs which are teachers, government staff, 
state enterprise employees, and private company employees. The experiment for 
indirect monetary incentive contains salary levels, in-service training, continuing 
education in university, dormitory, motorbike, and ability to select a school to teach. 
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5.4.3. Experimental design  
 
 A total combination (full factorial design) of levels in the rural location of 
school is 144 (32*24), the classroom conditions is 54 (33*2), the non-teaching jobs is 
12 (3*4), and the indirect monetary incentive is 96 (3*25). The full factorial design 
requires a large sample size, thus this study applies a fractional factorial design. A 
combination of levels in alternatives for every experiment is constructed by a D-
optimality with main effect design. 
The D-optimal design is one of the most famous techniques in experimental 
design. This kind of design helps to minimize an overall variance of estimated 
coefficients by maximizing the determinant of 𝐱′𝐱 (Atkinson and Donev, 1992). Thus 
the experiment would not require a huge number of respondents. The combination 
result from the design is shown in Appendix 5.1. 
A questionnaire consists of four choice experiments (one experiment per page). 
One experiment includes three choice sets and each choice set contains four 
alternatives (except for the non-teaching job experiment which has five alternatives). 
Each choice set is randomly selected to form one experiment set, and each experiment 
set is also randomly selected to form one questionnaire. Examples of questionnaire 
and the choice sets are shown in Appendix 5.2. Every questionnaire set is randomly 
distributed to respondent with equal frequency. 
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Table 5.1 – Attributes and Levels 
Attributes Levels 
Rural location of school   
  
Salary 
For Cambodia: 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 million Riel 
For Laos; 1, 2, 3 million Kip 
Travel time to closest town 3, 5, 10 hours 
No Electricity Yes, No 
No Mains water Yes, No 
No Hospital Yes, No 
No Regular market Yes, No 
  
Classroom  
  
Salary 
For Cambodia: 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 million Riel 
For Laos; 1, 2, 3 million Kip 
Floor Dirt, Concrete 
Class size 20, 30, 40 pupils 
Ethnicity of pupils 
For Cambodia: non Khmer pupils and 
Khmer pupils 
For Laos: non Lao pupils and Lao pupils 
  
Non-teaching jobs  
  
Salary 
For Cambodia: 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 million Riel 
For Laos; 1, 2, 3 million Kip 
Jobs 
Teacher, Government, State enterprise,  
Private company, No selection 
  
Indirect monetary incentives  
  
Salary 
For Cambodia: 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 million Riel 
For Laos; 1, 2, 3 million Kip 
In-service training Yes, No 
Continuing education in university Yes, No 
Dormitory Yes, No 
Motorbike Yes, No 
Choose school Yes, No 
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5.4.4. Data collection 
 
The experiments were conducted in October 2014 for Laos and February 2015 
for Cambodia. Two teacher training colleges were selected from Cambodia; Kandal 
teacher training college and Kandal regional teacher training college, and two teacher 
training colleges were selected from Laos; Dongkhamxang teacher training college 
and Bankern teacher training college. The two colleges from Cambodia are located in 
Kandal province which is very close to Phnom Penh. The Kandal teacher training 
college is for primary teacher trainees and Kandal regional teacher training college is 
for lower secondary teacher trainees. Both schools in Laos have primary and lower 
secondary teacher trainees. The Donkhamxang college is located in Vientiane capital 
and Bankern college is in Vientiane province, about 120 kilometers from the capital 
city. 
 Trainees are selected from several classes to participate in the experiments. 
The trainees for lower secondary are from local language and mathematics subjects. 
Before the trainees start to answer the choice sets, the enumerators show a sample 
questionnaire on A1 size paper to explain the meaning of each attribute and the 
method to select the alternatives. 
 Altogether, there are 205 trainees from Cambodia and 240 trainees from Laos. 
However, there are some mistakes in answering the questionnaire, thus the number of 
observations varies in each estimation. The respondents’ information is shown in 
Table 5.2. Female trainees make up 68.7 percent in Cambodia and 69.6 percent in 
Laos. Khmer ethnic trainees within Cambodian sample are 98.5 percent and 80.4 
percent of total Lao sample have Lao ethnicity. Trainees for lower secondary make 
up 56.6 percent in the Cambodian sample and 23.3 percent in Lao sample.  
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Table 5.2 – Demographic of Respondents 
 Cambodia Laos 
   
Female (percentage) 68.7 69.6 
Khmer/Lao ethnicity (percentage) 98.5 80.4 
To be lower secondary teacher (percentage) 56.6 23.3 
   
 
5.4.5. Econometric equation and calculation of willingness to accept 
 
A different selection among potential teachers allows us to analyze the 
probability to join the teaching profession conditional on the benefit and workplace 
environment. In DCE, a random utility model is used. Let a utility of alternative j for 
individual i is as: 
 
[5.8] 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝐱𝑖𝑗
′ 𝜷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  
 
where 𝐱 is a vector of alternative specific regressors, which are job characteristics, 
and 𝜷𝑖 is a vector of coefficients which is distributed by density 𝑓(𝜷|𝜽). The 𝜽 is the 
mean and covariance of 𝜷. 𝜀 is a disturbance term and is assumed to be identically 
and independently distributed as extreme value distribution. The equation [5.8] is the 
mixed logit model (Train, 2009). The mixed logit model relaxes the independent of 
irrelevant alternatives assumption by allowing the parameters to be normally 
distributed. 
 The econometric equation [5.9], [5.10], [5.11], and [5.12] are used to estimate 
for the rural location of schools, conditions of classrooms, non-teaching jobs, and 
indirect monetary incentives, respectively. 
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[5.9] P(select)=f(Salary, Travel-time, No-electricity, No-water, No-hospital,  
        No- market) 
 
[5.10] P(select)=f(Salary, Dirt-floor, Class-size, Ethnic-pupils)  
 
[5.11] P(select)=f(Salary, Government, State-enterprise, Private-company) 
 
[5.12] P(select)=f(Salary, Training, Education, Dormitory, Motorbike,  
       Select-school) 
 
where select is a dependent variable which is equal to one if a respondent selects the 
alternative from the choice set and zero for otherwise. Salary variable is the salary 
level and is used as the fixed variable in the mixed logit estimation. In equation [5.9], 
Travel-time variable shows the used hours for traveling to closest town. No-electricity, 
No-water, No-hospital, and No-market is a binary variable which indicates if the 
location of school does not have an electricity, mains water, hospital, and regular 
market,  respectively. In equation [5.10], Dirt-floor variable is equal to one if a 
material of classroom’s floor is dirt and zero if the material is concrete. Class-size 
variable shows a number of pupils in classroom, and Ethnic-pupils variable is equal 
to one if pupils are not ethnic majority. For equation [5.11], there are three variables 
which are non-teaching jobs. Government, State-enterprise, and Private-company 
equal to one if an offered job is government job, state enterprise job, and private 
company job, respectively; and it is equal to zero for otherwise. The teaching job is 
used as a referent group. In equation [5.12], variable of Training, Education, 
Dormitory, Motorbike, and Select-school equal to one if the government provide 
incentive program of an annual in-service training, continuing education in university, 
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provision of dormitory, providing of motorbike, and being able to select school to 
teach. 
The monetary value of willingness to accept the job (WTA) is calculated by 
dividing a coefficient of given job’s attribute to a coefficient of salary in negative form 
as: 
 
[5.13] 𝑊𝑇𝐴𝑐 = −
𝛽𝑐
𝛽𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦
. 
 
For simple interpretation and comparison between WTA values in Cambodia and 
Laos, the WTA value is transformed to a percentage different from the regular salary 
of teaching profession, which is 0.5 million Riel in Cambodia and 2 million Kip in 
Laos. 
 
5.5. Results 
 
5.5.1. Estimation of equations 
 
The estimation results from the rural location of school, classroom conditions, 
preference on non-teaching jobs, and indirect monetary incentives are shown in Table 
5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6, respectively. In each table, there are two columns which 
illustrates results of Cambodian and Lao cases. The results consist of a mean 
coefficient of each attribute and a standard deviation coefficient of random attributes. 
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Table 5.3 – Results for Rural Location of School 
Variables Cambodia Laos 
   
Mean    
   
Salary 5.249*** 0.719*** 
 (8.414) (7.600) 
Travel-time -0.285*** -0.147*** 
 (-5.824) (-4.675) 
No-electricity -1.925*** -2.273*** 
 (-6.549) (-9.092) 
No-main water -1.249*** -0.724*** 
 (-5.710) (-4.548) 
No-hospital -3.074*** -2.947*** 
 (-8.801) (-9.196) 
No-regular market -1.156*** -0.956*** 
 (-5.327) (-6.051) 
   
Standard deviation   
   
Travel-time 0.274*** 0.194*** 
 (3.430) (3.381) 
No-electricity 1.818*** 1.459*** 
 (5.402) (4.690) 
No-main water 1.125*** -0.860** 
 (3.246) (-2.442) 
No-hospital 1.678*** 2.255*** 
 (4.276) (6.282) 
No-regular market 1.175*** -0.566* 
 (3.533) (-1.898) 
   
Log-likelihood -533.5 -667.9 
Observations 2,460 2,856 
Respondents 205 238 
Note: z-statistics are in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
92 
 
Table 5.4 – Results for Classroom Conditions 
Variables Cambodia Laos 
   
Mean    
   
Salary 5.704*** 0.959*** 
 (11.294) (10.660) 
Dirt-floor -1.698*** -0.715*** 
 (-7.392) (-5.401) 
Class-size -0.040*** -0.073*** 
 (-3.609) (-6.507) 
Ethnic-pupils -1.157*** -2.918*** 
 (-4.493) (-8.880) 
   
Standard deviation   
   
Dirt-floor 1.605*** 0.727** 
 (4.877) (2.555) 
Class-size 0.067*** 0.073*** 
 (3.267) (3.931) 
Ethnic-pupils 2.598*** 2.859*** 
 (7.379) (7.450) 
   
Log-likelihood -605.2 -692.2 
Observations 2,460 2,876 
Respondents 205 238 
Note: z-statistics are in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.5 – Results for Non-Teaching Jobs 
Variables Cambodia Laos 
   
Mean    
   
Salary 5.001*** 1.669*** 
 (8.950) (6.673) 
Government -3.426*** -4.458*** 
 (-7.752) (-6.120) 
State-enterprise -2.741*** -7.493*** 
 (-8.275) (-5.420) 
Private-company -4.344*** -12.982*** 
 (-5.720) (-3.479) 
   
Standard deviation   
   
Government 2.665*** 5.451*** 
 (6.405) (6.977) 
State-enterprise 2.003*** 5.994*** 
 (5.830) (5.444) 
Private-company 0.562 5.435*** 
 (0.390) (3.420) 
   
Log-likelihood -447.3 -398.8 
Observations 2,372 2,760 
Respondents 205 238 
Note: z-statistics are in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.6 – Result for Indirect Monetary Incentives 
Variables Cambodia Laos 
   
Mean    
   
Salary 4.499*** 0.980*** 
 (8.631) (9.074) 
Training 1.901*** 1.148*** 
 (7.228) (6.453) 
Education 3.170*** 3.261*** 
 (8.158) (8.588) 
Dormitory 0.980*** 0.788*** 
 (4.395) (4.326) 
Motorbike 0.937*** 0.577*** 
 (3.937) (3.383) 
Select-school 1.477*** 1.433*** 
 (5.248) (6.512) 
   
Standard deviation   
   
Travel-time 1.434*** 0.974*** 
 (3.686) (3.204) 
No-electricity -1.455*** 2.276*** 
 (-3.097) (5.553) 
No-main water 1.334*** 1.168*** 
 (3.564) (3.859) 
No-hospital 1.540*** 0.918** 
 (4.122) (2.265) 
No-regular market 2.341*** -1.584*** 
 (5.286) (-4.772) 
   
Log-likelihood -529.4 -664.0 
Observations 2,420 2,844 
Respondents 202 237 
Note: z-statistics are in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Overall, all random parameters are statistically significant at the one percent 
level. The all attributes have the expected sign. The variable Salary has a positive sign 
in every estimation. Other attributes in the rural location of school and conditions of 
class room have the negative sign. It shows that the potential teachers are less likely 
to accept the job offer as the difficulties for joining teaching profession increase. 
Furthermore, all non-teaching jobs have a negative sign which shows that the potential 
teachers prefer the teaching profession over the government, state enterprise, and 
private company jobs. For the indirect monetary incentives, every attribute has the 
positive sign. It shows the possible trade of to the direct incentive pay. 
 
5.5.2. Willingness to accept the job attributes 
 
The value of WTA in local currency and in different percentage to the average 
salary are shown in Table 5.7.  For simplicity, the percentage of WTA is used for 
interpretation. The attributes in choice experiment of rural location of school, 
classroom conditions, and non-teaching jobs have a positive percentage; while the 
attributes of indirect monetary incentives have a negative percentage. The positive 
WTA percentage measures an additional percentage on top of salary that potential 
teachers require as compensation and the negative WTA percentage measures the 
percentage decrease in salary that potential teachers would accept of indirect monetary 
incentives. 
For the rural location of the school, Lao potential teachers require higher 
compensation than Cambodian potential teachers for most of attribute, except travel-
time which is very similar. The potential teachers from Cambodia and Laos prefer 
10.8 and 10.2 percent increase in salary for one hour increases in traveling time from 
the location to the town. If the location of the school does not have electricity,  
 
96 
 
Table 5.7 –WTA for Teaching Profession 
 WTA in million Riel for 
Cambodia and Kip for 
Laos 
WAT in different 
percentage from average 
salary 
 Cambodia Laos Cambodia Laos 
     
Rural location of school     
     
Time-travel 0.05 0.20 10.8 10.2 
No-electricity 0.37 3.16 73.3 158.0 
No-water 0.24 1.01 47.6 50.3 
No-hospital 0.59 4.10 117.1 204.8 
No-market 0.22 1.33 44.1 66.5 
     
Classroom     
     
Dirt-floor 0.30 0.75 59.5 37.3 
Class-size 0.01 0.08 1.4 3.8 
Ethnic-pupils 0.20 3.04 40.6 152.2 
     
Non-teaching jobs     
     
Government 0.68 2.67 137.0 133.5 
State-enterprise 0.55 4.49 109.6 224.4 
Private-company 0.87 7.78 173.7 388.8 
     
Indirect monetary incentives     
     
Training -0.42 -1.17 -84.5 -58.5 
Education -0.70 -3.33 -140.9 -166.4 
Dormitory -0.22 -0.80 -43.6 -40.2 
Motorbike -0.21 -0.59 -41.6 -29.4 
Select-school -0.33 -1.46 -65.6 -73.1 
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Cambodian potential teachers require 73.3 percent and Lao potential teachers demand 
for 158.0 percent. These are the second highest requirement for both countries. Then, 
for main water supply, the potential teachers prefer 47.6 percent in Cambodia and 50.3 
percent in Laos. The highest requirement for compensation in both countries is for an 
absence of hospitals, 117.1 percent for Cambodia and 204.8 percent for Laos. It shows 
that the health care is the imperative issue that the potential teachers care. The salary 
up lift required for a regular market is 44.1 percent in Cambodia and 66.5 percent in 
Laos. 
The poor condition of classroom lowers the willingness to accept the teaching 
jobs of the potential teachers. The Cambodian potential teachers require a 59.5 percent 
increase if the floor of classroom is made of dirt, while Lao potential teachers want 
37.3 percent. For the number of student per class, if a classroom includes one more 
pupil, Cambodian and Lao potential teachers want about 1.4 and 3.8 percent increase 
of salary, respectively. For ethnicity of pupils, the result shows that potential teacher 
in both countries are discouraged to join teaching profession if they are assigned to 
teach ethnic minority children (non-Khmer for Cambodia and non-Lao for Laos). Lao 
potential teachers demand a very high 152.2 percent; while Cambodian potential 
teachers want 40.6.  
All positive sign of non-teaching jobs attributes suggests that the teaching 
profession is the most preferred job among the potential teachers. The least likely job 
to be selected in both countries is in private companies. The potential teachers require 
173.7 percent in Cambodia and 388.3 percent in Laos for moving from teaching to 
work in private company. The most preferred non-teaching job in Cambodia is the 
state enterprise job (109.6 percent) and followed by the government job (137.0 
percent); while in Laos, the most preferred job is for the government (133.5 percent), 
followed by the state enterprise (224.4 percent). 
For the indirect monetary incentives, the most preferred indirect monetary 
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incentive in both countries is the continued education in university. The potential 
teachers will sacrifice more than a hundred percent of average salary (140.9 percent 
for Cambodia and 166.4 percent for Laos). Over one hundred percentage means that 
potential teachers would add their own money to obtain this incentive. The second 
most preferred incentive in Cambodia is the in-service training (84.5 percent); 
followed by the ability to select school (65.6 percent), a dormitory (43.6 percent), and 
a motorbike (41.6 percent), respectively. In the Lao case, after the continuing 
education, the preferences are the ability to select school (73.1 percent), in-service 
training (58.5 percent), a dormitory (40.2 percent), and a motorbike (29.4 percent), 
respectively. 
 
5.6.Discussion 
 
In general, the percentage of WTA of attributes appear to be high and too 
expensive for the government to compensate. However, the importance of the 
percentage of WTA is in the ranking. A budget to cover incentives to recruit new 
teachers should be allocated and ranked according to the percentage of WTA, to help 
the government to invest efficiently. 
To observe the possibility of not to joining the teaching profession, the 
percentage WTA of non-teaching jobs are used to compare with the percentage of 
WTA of the attributes of rural location and classroom conditions. Although, the 
percentage of WTA is high, the comparison is not a problem because both 
percentages are from what potential teachers’ preference. 
In Table 5.7, the percentage of WTA of most non-teaching jobs are higher than 
the percentage of attributes of rural location and classroom conditions. This means 
that where the WTA percentage of each non-teaching type of job is compared to each 
attributes of rural location and classroom conditions, there is only a small probability 
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that potential teachers would not join the teaching profession. However, where there 
is a school which has the combined attributes of no-hospital, no-electricity, and 
ethnic-pupils; the sum of WTA percentage of the combined attributes can easily 
exceed the WTA percentage of all types of non-teaching jobs. This suggests the 
possibility that potential teachers would be willing to move to non-teaching jobs. 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
  
Recruitment of new teachers is an imperative issue that needs to be addressed 
in order to ensure the number of qualified teachers. An increasing opportunity cost for 
the teaching profession is the major problem. Many studies suggest solutions such as 
providing monetary and non-monetary incentives. However, there are few studies that 
estimate an appropriate value for incentive programs, thus it is worthwhile to estimate 
the factors that influence potential teachers’ decision. 
 This study applies the discrete choice experiment with trainees from four 
teacher training colleges in Cambodia and Laos. The experiment in Cambodia was 
conducted in February 2015; and in Laos in October 2014. There are four experiment 
sets which are: rural location of the school, classroom conditions, non-teaching jobs, 
and indirect monetary incentives. The attributes for the rural location of the school are 
salary, time travel to closest town, electricity, mains water, hospitals, and regular 
markets. For the classroom conditions, the attributes are salary, material of classroom 
floor, class size, and ethnicity of students. For the non-teaching jobs attributes are 
salary, teaching jobs, government jobs, state enterprise jobs, and private company jobs. 
For the indirect monetary incentives attributes are salary, annual in-service training, 
continued education in university, provision of a dormitory, provision of a motorbike, 
and the ability to select the school to teach. The sample from Cambodia consists of 
205 teacher trainees and from Laos 240 trainees. The sample are potential teachers for 
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primary and lower secondary schools. The data from the experiment is used with the 
conditional logit model.  
 All attributes are statistically significant at the one percent level. Among the 
rural location of the school, an existence of hospitals is the most important factor and 
followed by the supply of electricity, regular market, and mains water. The time to 
travel to closest town is also important for potential teachers’ decision. For the 
classroom conditions, Cambodian potential teachers care more about the material of 
floor than Lao potential teachers, and Lao potential teachers care more about the 
ethnicity of student than Cambodians. Potential teachers in both countries have a 
lower preference to take non-teaching jobs (government, state enterprise, and private 
company) compared to the teaching profession. The least preferred job is to work with 
private companies. The state enterprise job is preferred to the government job in the 
Cambodian case; while the government job is preferred to state enterprise job in Laos. 
For the indirect incentives, the most preferred incentive is the continued education in 
university level and followed by the annual in-service training and the ability to select 
school. 
Overall, the compensated values to the teaching profession are very high and 
it seems to be difficult for the government to pay. However, the ranking of the value 
of attributes for teaching profession can benefit the government in setting an 
appropriate amount of incentive programs. The governments should allocate the 
budget of each incentive program regarding to the order of attributes which is 
suggested in this study. This can helps the governments to allocate the educational 
budget effectively. 
From comparing the percentage of WTA of non-teaching jobs to the 
percentage of WTA of the rural location and classroom condition one by one, it shows 
that there is small possibility for potential teachers not to join teaching profession. 
However, if the location of school includes several attributes of rural location and 
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classroom condition, the percentage of WTA of rural location and condition of 
classroom can easily surpasses the percentage of WTA of non-teaching jobs. This 
suggests the possibility that potential teachers would not join the teaching profession. 
 Limitation of this study is to control respondent’s characteristics such as the 
region and ethnicity. By interact some of the respondent’s characteristics, it is possible 
to find the cheaper way to pay for teacher incentives. For example, trainees might 
prefer to work in some particular place such as hometown, city, or famous schools. 
Thus, it is encouraged for future study to investigate more respondent’s characteristics 
as well as attributes that can influence a potential teachers’ decision.
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Appendix 5.1. Combination Result from the D-optimality with Main Effect Design for Lao Case 
For rural location of school 
Note: F1 = salary, F2 = distance from location to closest town, F3 = electricity, F4 = main water, F5 = hospital, F6 = regular market. 
Block F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
Block 1 3000000 3 yes  yes yes yes  1000000 1 no  no  yes no 1000000 1 no no yes no 3000000 3 no yes no yes 
Block 1 2000000 1 no no  no no  3000000 5 yes  yes no yes 2000000 5 yes yes no yes 1000000 5 yes no yes no 
Block 1 2000000 3 yes  no  no yes  2000000 1 no  no  no no 3000000 3 no no yes no 3000000 1 yes no no yes 
Block 2 1000000 1 no no  yes yes  3000000 3 yes  no  yes no 1000000 3 yes no yes no 2000000 3 no yes yes yes 
Block 2 3000000 5 yes  yes no no  1000000 1 no  yes no yes 2000000 5 no yes no yes 3000000 1 yes no no no 
Block 2 2000000 5 no no  yes no  2000000 1 yes  no  yes no 3000000 3 yes yes no yes 1000000 5 yes no no yes 
Block 3 1000000 5 yes  yes yes yes  2000000 5 yes  yes yes yes 3000000 3 yes no no no 3000000 3 yes no no yes 
Block 3 3000000 3 no no  no no  1000000 1 no  no  no no 1000000 1 no yes yes yes 2000000 5 no yes yes no 
Block 3 2000000 1 no no  no no  1000000 1 no  no  no yes 1000000 1 yes no no no 1000000 1 yes no no no 
Block 4 1000000 1 no no  no no  3000000 1 no  yes no no 2000000 5 no no yes no 2000000 1 yes no no no 
Block 4 2000000 1 no no  no no  2000000 3 yes  yes no no 1000000 3 yes yes yes yes 3000000 5 no yes no yes 
Block 4 3000000 5 no yes yes no  3000000 5 yes  no  no no 3000000 3 no no no no 1000000 3 no yes no yes 
Block 5 1000000 1 no no  yes no  1000000 5 no  no  no yes 3000000 1 no no yes no 1000000 1 no no yes yes 
Block 5 3000000 3 yes  yes no yes  2000000 3 yes  yes yes no 1000000 3 yes yes no yes 2000000 5 yes yes no no 
Block 5 3000000 3 yes  yes no yes  2000000 3 yes  yes yes no 1000000 3 yes yes no yes 2000000 5 yes yes no no 
Block 6 3000000 1 yes  no  yes no  1000000 3 yes  yes yes yes 3000000 5 no no yes yes 3000000 3 yes yes no no 
Block 6 1000000 5 no yes no yes  3000000 5 no  no  no no 1000000 3 yes yes no no 2000000 1 no no yes yes 
Block 6 3000000 1 yes  no  yes no  1000000 3 yes  yes yes yes 3000000 5 no no yes yes 3000000 3 yes yes no no 
Block 7 2000000 3 yes  yes yes no  1000000 1 yes  no  yes yes 1000000 3 yes yes no no 1000000 5 yes no yes no 
Block 7 1000000 5 no no  no yes  2000000 5 no  yes no no 2000000 1 no no yes yes 2000000 1 no yes no yes 
Block 7 2000000 3 yes  yes yes no  1000000 1 yes  no  yes yes 1000000 3 yes yes no no 1000000 5 yes no yes no 
Block 8 3000000 1 yes  no  yes yes  2000000 1 no  no  no no 3000000 5 no yes no no 2000000 5 yes yes yes yes 
Block 8 1000000 3 no yes no no  1000000 3 yes  yes yes yes 1000000 1 yes no yes yes 3000000 1 no no no no 
Block 9 3000000 3 yes  no  yes no  2000000 5 no  yes no yes 2000000 3 no no no no 2000000 5 no no no yes 
Block 9 2000000 5 no yes no yes  3000000 1 yes  no  yes no 3000000 5 yes yes yes yes 1000000 1 yes yes yes no 
Block 10 3000000 3 no no  no yes  2000000 1 yes  no  yes yes 3000000 5 yes no no yes 3000000 1 no no yes yes 
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Block 10 2000000 5 yes  yes yes no  3000000 3 no  yes no no 2000000 1 no yes yes no 1000000 5 yes yes no no 
Block 11 1000000 5 yes  no  no no  3000000 1 yes  no  no yes 2000000 3 no no no yes 3000000 5 yes yes yes yes 
Block 11 3000000 1 no yes yes yes  1000000 5 no  yes yes no 3000000 5 yes yes yes no 2000000 1 no no no no 
Block 12 3000000 5 no no  yes no  2000000 5 yes  no  yes yes 2000000 3 yes yes yes no 1000000 1 yes yes no no 
Block 12 1000000 1 yes  yes no yes  3000000 3 no  yes no no 3000000 5 no no no yes 3000000 5 no no yes yes 
Block 13 2000000 3 yes  no  no no  3000000 1 no  yes no yes 1000000 5 yes no yes no 2000000 3 yes yes no yes 
Block 13 3000000 1 no yes yes yes  2000000 3 yes  no  yes no 2000000 1 no yes no yes 3000000 5 no no yes no 
Block 14 3000000 5 yes  no  no no  3000000 3 no  no  yes no 3000000 3 yes no yes yes 1000000 5 yes no no yes 
Block 14 2000000 1 no yes yes yes  2000000 5 yes  yes no yes 1000000 1 no yes no no 3000000 3 no yes yes no 
Block 15 1000000 3 no yes yes yes  3000000 3 no  no  no yes 3000000 3 no no no yes 1000000 1 yes yes no no 
Block 15 2000000 5 yes  no  no no  1000000 1 yes  yes yes no 2000000 5 yes yes yes no 3000000 5 no no yes yes 
Block 16 2000000 3 no no  yes yes  3000000 1 yes  yes no no 3000000 1 yes no no no 3000000 1 no no no no 
Block 16 1000000 5 yes  yes no no  1000000 5 no  no  yes yes 1000000 5 no yes yes yes 2000000 3 yes yes yes yes 
Block 17 3000000 5 yes  no  no yes  1000000 5 yes  yes yes no 3000000 3 no no no yes 1000000 3 no yes yes no 
Block 17 1000000 1 no yes yes no  2000000 3 no  no  no yes 2000000 5 yes yes yes no 3000000 5 yes no no yes 
Block 18 2000000 3 no yes no no  2000000 3 no  no  yes no 3000000 5 no no no no 1000000 3 no yes yes no 
Block 18 3000000 1 yes  no  yes yes  1000000 1 yes  yes no yes 1000000 1 yes yes yes yes 2000000 1 yes no no yes 
Block 19 2000000 1 no yes no no  3000000 5 yes  no  no yes 3000000 1 no yes yes yes 3000000 3 no no no yes 
Block 19 1000000 3 yes  no  yes yes  1000000 3 no  yes yes no 2000000 5 yes no no no 1000000 1 yes yes yes no 
Block 20 1000000 5 no yes no yes  1000000 1 yes  no  no yes 3000000 3 no no yes no 2000000 5 no yes no no 
Block 20 3000000 3 yes  no  yes no  3000000 5 no  yes yes no 1000000 1 yes yes no yes 3000000 3 yes no yes yes 
Block 21 1000000 1 no yes yes no  1000000 1 no  yes no no 2000000 3 yes yes no yes 1000000 3 no yes no yes 
Block 21 2000000 5 yes  no  no yes  2000000 3 yes  no  yes yes 1000000 1 no no yes no 2000000 1 yes no yes no 
Block 22 1000000 3 yes  yes no no  2000000 1 yes  yes yes no 3000000 1 no yes yes yes 1000000 1 yes no yes yes 
Block 22 3000000 5 no no  yes yes  1000000 3 no  no  no yes 1000000 5 yes no no no 3000000 3 no yes no no 
Block 23 3000000 3 yes  yes no yes  3000000 3 yes  no  no yes 2000000 5 no yes yes no 1000000 3 no no yes yes 
Block 23 2000000 5 no no  yes no  2000000 5 no  yes yes no 1000000 1 yes no no yes 3000000 5 yes yes no no 
Block 24 2000000 1 no yes yes no  3000000 1 no  yes yes yes 2000000 3 no no yes yes 2000000 1 no no yes no 
Block 24 1000000 3 yes  no  no yes  1000000 5 yes  no  no no 3000000 1 yes yes no no 1000000 5 yes yes no yes 
Block 25 2000000 3 yes  yes yes no  3000000 5 yes  no  yes yes 2000000 5 no yes no yes 2000000 1 no yes no yes 
Block 25 3000000 1 no no  no yes  2000000 1 no  yes no no 1000000 3 yes no yes no 1000000 3 yes no yes no 
Block 26 2000000 1 yes  no  no yes  2000000 3 no  yes yes yes 1000000 3 no yes no no 1000000 1 no yes no yes 
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Block 26 1000000 3 no yes yes no  3000000 5 yes  no  no no 2000000 1 yes no yes yes 2000000 3 yes no yes no 
Block 27 3000000 5 yes  yes yes no  2000000 3 yes  yes no yes 3000000 1 yes no no yes 1000000 5 no yes yes yes 
Block 27 1000000 1 no no  no yes  1000000 5 no  no  yes no 2000000 3 no yes yes no 3000000 3 yes no no no 
Block 28 2000000 3 no yes yes yes  1000000 5 yes  no  no no 1000000 5 no no yes yes 1000000 5 yes no no yes 
Block 28 1000000 1 yes  no  no no  3000000 3 no  yes yes yes 3000000 1 yes yes no no 2000000 3 no yes yes no 
Block 29 1000000 5 yes  no  yes no  2000000 3 yes  no  no no 1000000 5 no yes no yes 2000000 3 no no no no 
Block 29 3000000 3 no yes no yes  3000000 5 no  yes yes yes 2000000 1 yes no yes no 3000000 5 yes yes yes yes 
Block 30 3000000 5 no no  yes no  1000000 3 yes  yes no no 3000000 3 no yes yes no 3000000 1 yes yes yes yes 
Block 30 2000000 1 yes  yes no yes  2000000 1 no  no  yes yes 2000000 1 yes no no yes 1000000 3 no no no no 
Block 31 2000000 3 yes  no  yes yes  2000000 5 no  no  no yes 3000000 3 yes yes yes yes 3000000 5 no yes yes no 
Block 31 3000000 1 no yes no no  3000000 1 yes  yes yes no 1000000 1 no no no no 2000000 3 yes no no yes 
Block 32 1000000 5 no no  yes yes  3000000 1 no  yes yes yes 1000000 5 no yes yes no 1000000 5 no no no no 
Block 32 2000000 1 yes  yes no no  1000000 3 yes  no  no no 2000000 3 yes no no yes 2000000 1 yes yes yes yes 
Block 33 2000000 5 no no  yes yes  1000000 3 no  yes yes yes 2000000 1 no yes no yes 2000000 3 yes no yes yes 
Block 33 3000000 1 yes  yes no no  3000000 5 yes  no  no no 1000000 5 yes no yes no 3000000 1 no yes no no 
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For condition of classroom 
Note: F1 = salary, F2 = condition of floor, F3 = number of pupils in class, F4 = pupils’ ethnicity. 
Block F1 F2 F3 F4 F1 F2 F3 F4 F1 F2 F3 F4 F1 F2 F3 F4 
Block 1 2,000,000 cement 40 hmong 2,000,000 yes 40 hmong 3,000,000 dirt 30 khmur 2,000,000 cement 30 hmong 
Block 1 3,000,000 cement 20 lao 3,000,000 no 30 khmur 1,000,000 cement 20 hmong 1,000,000 cement 20 lao 
Block 1 1,000,000 dirt 30 hmong 3,000,000 no 20 lao 1,000,000 dirt 20 lao 2,000,000 dirt 20 khmur 
Block 2 1,000,000 dirt 40 khmur 1,000,000 no 20 hmong 1,000,000 cement 40 lao 3,000,000 dirt 20 hmong 
Block 2 3,000,000 dirt 20 hmong 2,000,000 yes 30 hmong 3,000,000 cement 20 khmur 2,000,000 dirt 30 khmur 
Block 2 2,000,000 cement 30 lao 3,000,000 no 40 lao 2,000,000 dirt 30 hmong 3,000,000 cement 40 hmong 
Block 3 1,000,000 cement 30 lao 1,000,000 yes 30 lao 3,000,000 cement 30 khmur 3,000,000 dirt 40 khmur 
Block 3 3,000,000 dirt 30 khmur 2,000,000 no 40 khmur 2,000,000 dirt 40 lao 2,000,000 cement 20 lao 
Block 3 2,000,000 cement 20 hmong 3,000,000 yes 20 hmong 1,000,000 dirt 20 lao 1,000,000 cement 30 hmong 
Block 4 1,000,000 dirt 30 hmong 1,000,000 no 30 hmong 2,000,000 dirt 30 hmong 2,000,000 cement 40 hmong 
Block 4 3,000,000 dirt 40 lao 2,000,000 yes 20 lao 3,000,000 dirt 40 khmur 1,000,000 dirt 20 lao 
Block 4 2,000,000 cement 30 khmur 1,000,000 yes 40 khmur 1,000,000 cement 20 lao 3,000,000 dirt 30 lao 
Block 5 2,000,000 dirt 40 hmong 3,000,000 yes 30 khmur 3,000,000 cement 30 khmur 3,000,000 cement 30 lao 
Block 5 3,000,000 dirt 40 khmur 1,000,000 yes 40 lao 2,000,000 dirt 20 hmong 1,000,000 dirt 40 khmur 
Block 5 1,000,000 cement 20 lao 2,000,000 no 30 hmong 2,000,000 dirt 40 lao 2,000,000 dirt 20 khmur 
Block 6 1,000,000 cement 30 khmur 2,000,000 no 20 lao 3,000,000 cement 20 hmong 1,000,000 cement 30 lao 
Block 6 3,000,000 dirt 40 lao 3,000,000 yes 40 hmong 1,000,000 cement 30 lao 3,000,000 cement 20 khmur 
Block 6 2,000,000 cement 20 hmong 1,000,000 yes 30 khmur 2,000,000 dirt 40 khmur 2,000,000 dirt 40 hmong 
Block 7 1,000,000 dirt 40 lao 1,000,000 yes 30 lao 2,000,000 cement 40 hmong 1,000,000 dirt 30 hmong 
Block 7 3,000,000 cement 20 hmong 2,000,000 no 40 lao 1,000,000 dirt 20 khmur 3,000,000 cement 40 hmong 
Block 7 2,000,000 cement 30 khmur 3,000,000 yes 20 khmur 3,000,000 dirt 30 hmong 2,000,000 dirt 20 khmur 
Block 8 3,000,000 cement 30 hmong 3,000,000 no 30 lao 3,000,000 cement 40 lao 1,000,000 dirt 40 khmur 
Block 8 3,000,000 cement 20 lao 1,000,000 yes 40 hmong 2,000,000 dirt 30 hmong 3,000,000 dirt 30 lao 
Block 8 1,000,000 dirt 40 lao 2,000,000 yes 20 khmur 1,000,000 cement 20 khmur 2,000,000 cement 40 khmur 
Block 9 1,000,000 dirt 20 hmong 2,000,000 no 40 khmur 3,000,000 cement 30 hmong 1,000,000 dirt 20 hmong 
Block 9 2,000,000 dirt 30 lao 2,000,000 yes 30 hmong 2,000,000 cement 40 lao 1,000,000 cement 40 lao 
Block 9 3,000,000 cement 40 lao 1,000,000 no 20 lao 1,000,000 dirt 20 lao 2,000,000 cement 30 lao 
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Block 10 3,000,000 cement 20 hmong 1,000,000 yes 20 khmur 2,000,000 cement 30 lao 1,000,000 cement 30 khmur 
Block 10 2,000,000 dirt 40 hmong 2,000,000 no 30 hmong 2,000,000 dirt 20 hmong 3,000,000 dirt 20 lao 
Block 10 1,000,000 dirt 30 khmur 3,000,000 yes 40 hmong 1,000,000 dirt 40 khmur 2,000,000 dirt 30 hmong 
Block 11 1,000,000 dirt 30 hmong 1,000,000 yes 40 hmong 3,000,000 dirt 20 khmur 1,000,000 cement 20 lao 
Block 11 3,000,000 cement 40 khmur 2,000,000 no 30 khmur 1,000,000 cement 30 hmong 2,000,000 dirt 40 hmong 
Block 11 1,000,000 dirt 20 khmur 3,000,000 yes 20 lao 2,000,000 dirt 30 lao 3,000,000 dirt 40 lao 
Block 12 2,000,000 dirt 20 lao 1,000,000 no 40 hmong 3,000,000 cement 20 lao 2,000,000 dirt 40 lao 
Block 12 3,000,000 cement 30 hmong 2,000,000 yes 20 khmur 2,000,000 dirt 40 khmur 3,000,000 cement 20 khmur 
Block 12 2,000,000 dirt 20 khmur 3,000,000 yes 30 hmong 1,000,000 dirt 40 lao 2,000,000 cement 20 lao 
Block 13 3,000,000 cement 40 lao 3,000,000 yes 20 hmong 3,000,000 cement 40 hmong 3,000,000 dirt 40 hmong 
Block 13 1,000,000 dirt 20 lao 2,000,000 yes 30 hmong 1,000,000 cement 20 lao 1,000,000 dirt 20 hmong 
Block 13 2,000,000 dirt 20 khmur 1,000,000 no 30 lao 1,000,000 dirt 30 khmur 1,000,000 cement 30 khmur 
Block 14 3,000,000 cement 20 khmur 1,000,000 no 20 hmong 1,000,000 cement 30 khmur 1,000,000 cement 40 lao 
Block 14 2,000,000 dirt 20 hmong 3,000,000 no 40 lao 2,000,000 cement 40 hmong 2,000,000 cement 30 khmur 
Block 14 3,000,000 cement 30 lao 2,000,000 yes 30 khmur 3,000,000 dirt 30 lao 1,000,000 dirt 40 hmong 
Block 15 1,000,000 cement 40 hmong 3,000,000 no 40 khmur 2,000,000 dirt 30 khmur 1,000,000 dirt 30 lao 
Block 15 2,000,000 dirt 20 khmur 1,000,000 yes 30 lao 3,000,000 cement 40 hmong 3,000,000 cement 20 hmong 
Block 15 1,000,000 dirt 20 khmur 1,000,000 no 20 hmong 2,000,000 dirt 20 lao 1,000,000 cement 30 lao 
Block 16 1,000,000 cement 40 hmong 2,000,000 yes 40 lao 1,000,000 dirt 40 hmong 2,000,000 cement 40 lao 
Block 16 1,000,000 cement 40 hmong 2,000,000 yes 40 lao 1,000,000 dirt 40 hmong 2,000,000 cement 40 lao 
Block 16 3,000,000 dirt 30 lao 3,000,000 no 20 hmong 2,000,000 cement 20 khmur 3,000,000 dirt 30 hmong 
Block 17 2,000,000 dirt 30 lao 1,000,000 no 20 khmur 1,000,000 dirt 40 hmong 3,000,000 dirt 30 khmur 
Block 17 2,000,000 dirt 30 lao 1,000,000 no 20 khmur 1,000,000 dirt 40 hmong 3,000,000 dirt 30 khmur 
Block 17 1,000,000 cement 40 khmur 3,000,000 yes 30 lao 2,000,000 cement 20 khmur 2,000,000 cement 20 hmong 
Block 18 1,000,000 dirt 40 khmur 3,000,000 no 30 khmur 3,000,000 dirt 20 lao 3,000,000 cement 30 khmur 
Block 18 1,000,000 cement 20 lao 1,000,000 yes 20 hmong 1,000,000 dirt 20 khmur 2,000,000 dirt 20 lao 
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For teaching and non-teaching jobs 
Note: F1 = teacher, F2 = government officer, F3 = state-enterprise employee, F4 = private 
company employee. 
Block F1 F2 F3 F4 
Block 1 500000 500000 750000 750000 
Block 1 750000 750000 500000 250000 
Block 1 250000 250000 250000 500000 
Block 1 500000 500000 750000 750000 
Block 2 250000 250000 500000 250000 
Block 2 750000 500000 250000 750000 
Block 2 250000 750000 750000 500000 
Block 3 250000 250000 250000 250000 
Block 3 250000 500000 250000 250000 
Block 3 500000 750000 500000 500000 
Block 4 500000 250000 500000 250000 
Block 4 750000 750000 250000 500000 
Block 4 250000 250000 500000 750000 
Block 5 500000 250000 250000 250000 
Block 5 750000 250000 750000 750000 
Block 5 250000 500000 500000 500000 
Block 6 250000 500000 750000 250000 
Block 6 500000 250000 250000 500000 
Block 6 750000 500000 500000 750000 
Block 7 250000 750000 250000 750000 
Block 7 250000 750000 250000 750000 
Block 7 750000 250000 750000 500000 
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For teaching and non-teaching jobs 
Note: F1 = teacher, F2 = government officer, F3 = state-enterprise employee, F4 = private company employee. 
Block F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
Block 1 1,000,000 yes yes yes no no 3,000,000 yes yes no no yes 2,000,000 yes yes yes yes yes 1,000,000 yes yes yes yes yes 
Block 1 2,000,000 no no yes yes yes 1,000,000 no no no no no 3,000,000 no no yes yes no 3,000,000 no no no no yes 
Block 1 2,000,000 no no yes no yes 3,000,000 no yes yes yes yes 1,000,000 no yes no no yes 3,000,000 no yes yes yes yes 
Block 2 1,000,000 yes yes no yes yes 1,000,000 no no yes no no 2,000,000 yes yes yes yes no 2,000,000 yes yes yes no no 
Block 2 2,000,000 no yes yes no no 1,000,000 yes no no yes yes 1,000,000 yes yes no yes yes 1,000,000 no no no yes no 
Block 2 3,000,000 no no no no yes 3,000,000 yes yes yes yes yes 3,000,000 no no yes no yes 3,000,000 yes yes no no yes 
Block 3 3,000,000 yes yes yes yes no 2,000,000 yes yes yes no yes 1,000,000 yes no no yes yes 3,000,000 yes no yes no yes 
Block 3 2,000,000 yes no yes no yes 2,000,000 yes yes no no yes 2,000,000 no yes yes no no 2,000,000 yes yes no yes no 
Block 3 1,000,000 no yes no no yes 1,000,000 no no no yes no 3,000,000 no no no no yes 1,000,000 no no yes no no 
Block 4 1,000,000 no yes yes yes no 2,000,000 yes no no yes yes 2,000,000 no no yes no yes 1,000,000 yes yes no no yes 
Block 4 2,000,000 yes no no no yes 1,000,000 yes yes no yes yes 1,000,000 no yes yes yes no 3,000,000 yes no yes no no 
Block 4 3,000,000 no no yes no yes 2,000,000 no no yes no no 3,000,000 yes no no yes no 2,000,000 no yes no yes no 
Block 5 3,000,000 yes yes no yes yes 2,000,000 yes yes no no no 2,000,000 yes no yes no yes 3,000,000 no no yes yes no 
Block 5 1,000,000 yes no yes no no 1,000,000 no yes yes yes no 3,000,000 no yes no yes no 3,000,000 yes yes yes yes yes 
Block 5 2,000,000 no no no yes no 3,000,000 no no yes yes yes 1,000,000 yes no yes no no 2,000,000 yes yes no no yes 
Block 6 3,000,000 yes no no yes yes 1,000,000 no yes yes no yes 2,000,000 no no no no no 1,000,000 yes no no yes no 
Block 6 1,000,000 no yes no no no 2,000,000 yes yes no no no 1,000,000 no yes yes yes no 2,000,000 no no no no yes 
Block 6 2,000,000 yes yes yes no yes 3,000,000 yes no yes yes no 3,000,000 yes no yes yes yes 3,000,000 yes yes yes yes no 
Block 7 3,000,000 yes yes no no yes 1,000,000 yes no yes no yes 1,000,000 no yes no no yes 2,000,000 yes yes no no yes 
Block 7 2,000,000 no no yes yes no 2,000,000 yes no yes yes no 2,000,000 no no yes no no 3,000,000 yes no yes yes no 
Block 7 1,000,000 no no no yes no 3,000,000 no yes no no yes 3,000,000 yes yes no yes yes 3,000,000 no yes yes no no 
Block 8 2,000,000 yes yes yes yes yes 1,000,000 no yes no yes no 1,000,000 yes yes yes no yes 3,000,000 no yes no no yes 
Block 8 1,000,000 no yes no no yes 1,000,000 yes no no no yes 3,000,000 yes no yes yes no 1,000,000 yes no yes yes yes 
Block 8 3,000,000 yes no no no no 3,000,000 yes no yes yes no 2,000,000 no yes no no yes 2,000,000 no no yes no no 
Block 9 2,000,000 no yes yes yes yes 3,000,000 yes yes yes no yes 2,000,000 no no no yes no 2,000,000 no yes yes yes yes 
Block 9 1,000,000 yes no yes yes yes 2,000,000 yes no yes yes yes 3,000,000 yes yes no no no 3,000,000 yes no no no no 
Block 9 3,000,000 yes no no no no 2,000,000 no yes no yes no 1,000,000 yes no yes yes yes 1,000,000 yes yes yes yes yes 
Block 10 1,000,000 yes yes yes yes yes 3,000,000 no yes no no no 1,000,000 no no no yes yes 2,000,000 yes no no yes no 
Block 10 3,000,000 no no yes no no 1,000,000 no no yes no yes 2,000,000 yes yes yes no yes 3,000,000 no yes yes no no 
Block 10 2,000,000 yes yes no yes yes 2,000,000 yes yes yes yes yes 3,000,000 yes yes no yes no 1,000,000 no yes yes yes yes 
Block 11 3,000,000 yes yes yes yes no 3,000,000 no no no yes yes 3,000,000 yes yes yes no no 2,000,000 no no yes yes yes 
Block 11 1,000,000 no yes no no no 1,000,000 yes yes yes yes no 1,000,000 no no yes no no 3,000,000 no yes no yes no 
Block 11 2,000,000 no no no no yes 2,000,000 yes yes yes no no 2,000,000 no no no yes yes 1,000,000 yes yes no no no 
Block 12 1,000,000 no no yes yes yes 3,000,000 yes yes yes no no 1,000,000 yes yes yes no yes 1,000,000 no no yes yes yes 
Block 12 3,000,000 yes yes no no no 2,000,000 no no no yes yes 2,000,000 no no no yes no 3,000,000 yes yes no no no 
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Block 12 1,000,000 yes no yes no no 1,000,000 yes yes yes yes yes 2,000,000 yes no yes yes yes 2,000,000 no yes no no no 
Block 13 2,000,000 yes no no yes no 1,000,000 yes no no no no 3,000,000 no no no no yes 2,000,000 no yes yes yes yes 
Block 13 3,000,000 no yes yes no yes 3,000,000 no yes yes yes yes 2,000,000 yes yes yes yes no 1,000,000 yes no no no no 
Block 13 1,000,000 yes yes no no yes 1,000,000 yes yes yes yes no 1,000,000 yes yes no yes yes 1,000,000 yes yes no yes no 
Block 14 1,000,000 yes no no no yes 2,000,000 no no yes no yes 2,000,000 no no yes yes yes 3,000,000 no no no yes yes 
Block 14 3,000,000 no yes yes yes no 1,000,000 yes yes no yes no 3,000,000 yes yes no no no 2,000,000 yes yes yes no no 
Block 14 2,000,000 yes yes yes yes no 3,000,000 yes yes no yes no 1,000,000 yes no no yes no 1,000,000 no no yes no no 
Block 15 3,000,000 no no yes yes yes 2,000,000 yes no no yes yes 1,000,000 no no yes yes yes 2,000,000 no yes yes no no 
Block 15 2,000,000 yes yes no no no 3,000,000 no yes yes no no 2,000,000 yes yes no no no 3,000,000 yes no no yes yes 
Block 15 1,000,000 no no yes yes no 1,000,000 no yes yes yes no 1,000,000 yes no yes yes yes 1,000,000 yes no yes no no 
Block 16 2,000,000 no yes no yes no 1,000,000 no yes yes yes yes 3,000,000 no yes yes yes yes 2,000,000 yes no no yes no 
Block 16 1,000,000 yes no yes no yes 3,000,000 yes no no no no 1,000,000 yes no no no no 1,000,000 no yes yes no yes 
Block 16 1,000,000 yes no yes no yes 3,000,000 yes no no no no 1,000,000 yes no no no no 1,000,000 no yes yes no yes 
Block 17 3,000,000 no no no yes yes 1,000,000 yes no no yes no 2,000,000 yes yes no yes yes 3,000,000 yes yes no yes yes 
Block 17 2,000,000 yes yes yes no no 2,000,000 no yes yes no yes 3,000,000 no no yes no no 1,000,000 no no yes no no 
Block 17 2,000,000 yes yes yes no no 2,000,000 no yes yes no yes 3,000,000 no no yes no no 1,000,000 no no yes no no 
Block 18 3,000,000 yes no yes yes no 3,000,000 yes no no no no 3,000,000 no yes yes yes yes 1,000,000 yes yes no no no 
Block 18 2,000,000 no no yes no yes 2,000,000 no yes no yes yes 2,000,000 yes no no no yes 2,000,000 yes no yes no yes 
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Appendix 5.2. Questionnaire and Example of Choice Sets in Lao` 
 
To respondent, this survey is to examine teacher trainees' preference on teaching 
difficulty and possible incentive program. Your answer will be keep in secrete and 
will not be used in the way that may trouble you. So, please provide a completed 
and real answer. Thank you for your cooperation. 
Question How to answer Answer 
Name of school Note   
Sex Male = 1, female =2   
Ethnicity Lao = 1, other = 2,    
Marriage status Single = 1, married = 2   
Weekly general 
expenditure 
Note   
Study performance 
Poor = 1, normal = 2, 
good = 3, excellent = 4 
  
For those who will 
secondary teacher, please 
indicate your subject 
Note   
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An example for a choice set of the rural location of school 
If you are assigned to teach in a school which is located in the rural locations such as 
in the choice set below. Which is the most satisfied alternative that you are willing to 
accept? 
 
 
Alternative 
1 
Alternative 
2 
Alternative 
3 
Alternative 
4 
Time spent to travel to  
closest town (hours) 
5 3 5 5 
Electricity supply in village Yes Yes Yes No 
Mains water supply in village Yes No No Yes 
Hospital in village No No No Yes 
Regular market in village No No No No 
Salary (Kip) 3,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000 
Please select the most 
stratified alternative     
 
 
An example for a choice set of the condition of classrooms 
If you are assigned to teach in a school with classroom condition such as in the choice 
set below. Which is the most satisfied alternative that you are willing to accept? 
 
 
Alternative
1 
Alternative
2 
Alternative
3 
Alternativ
e4 
Material of classroom floor Concrete Concrete Dirt Concrete 
Number of pupils per class 40 40 30 30 
Ethnicity of pupils Non-Lao Non-Lao Non-Lao Lao 
Salary (Kip) 2,000,000 2,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 
Please select the most 
stratified alternative     
 
 
An example for a choice set of the non-teaching jobs 
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If you are able to select occupation such as in the choice set below. Which is the most 
satisfied alternative that you are willing to accept? 
 
 Alternative 
1 
Alternative 
2 
Alternative 
3 
Alternative 
4 
Type of job Teacher Government State 
enterprise 
Private 
company 
Salary 3,000,000 3,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 
Please select the 
most stratified 
alternative 
    
 
 
An example for a choice set of the indirect monetary incentive 
If the government is willing to improve teaching profession by providing a set of 
incentive programs such as in the choice set below. Which is the most satisfied 
alternative that you are willing to accept? 
 
 
Alternative 
1 
Alternative 
2 
Alternative 
3 
Alternativ
e 
4 
Motorbike Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Teacher dormitory Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Being able to select school to 
teach Yes No Yes Yes 
Continuing education in 
University No No Yes Yes 
Annual in-service training No Yes Yes Yes 
Salary (Kip) 3,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000 
Please select the most 
stratified alternative     
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
6.1. Conclusion 
 
Education plays a very important role in economic development. Human 
capital increases labor productivity and generates several benefits to society. 
Therefore, ensuring children to complete basic education is an imperative issue to be 
addressed. An out-of-school problem is a major issue. One of the factors that influence 
the out-of-school problem is an expansion of employment. Generally, the growth of 
employment increases wage levels and provides employment opportunities. Thus, it 
increases the opportunity cost for not working which effects the decision of 
households, students, and teachers. This dissertation analyzes the effect of the growth 
of un-skilled labor demand on the out-of-school children in Chapter three, the 
characteristics of employment on the possibility of secondary school students 
dropping out in Chapter four, and the probability of teacher trainees not to join a 
teaching profession and move to non-teaching professions in Chapter five. 
 To investigate the effect of the un-skilled labor demand on the out-of-school 
children, this study apply an econometric equation with the data of Cambodian and 
Lao household surveys in 2012. The dependent variables indicate whether the school 
age children are in school or not. The interested independent variables are the growth 
of labor demand in agriculture and service sectors. The rice production and number 
of buildings in service business are proxy for the agriculture and service sectors, 
respectively. To analyze the effect of job’ characteristics on the possibility of 
secondary school students to drop out for work, the choice experiment is employed. 
The experiment was conducted at the Laongarm Complete Secondary  
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school in October 2013. The secondary school students were offered the hypothetical 
jobs and were asked their preference of the jobs. They were also informed that they 
would have a possibility to be recruited, if they accepted the job offer. The answer of 
students is used in an econometric equation with the characteristics of students and 
jobs as independent variables. For the possibility of not joining the teaching profession 
of teacher trainees, the discrete choice experiment is used with trainees from two 
teacher training schools in Cambodia and two teacher training schools in Laos. There 
are four experiments which are the rural location of school, conditions of classroom, 
preference on non-teaching professions, and indirect monetary incentives. 
 The results from the effect of the growth of un-skilled labor demand on out-
of-school suggest that the expansion of agricultural and service sectors increase 
number of out-of-school children. The effect of the sectors between male and female 
children is similar, while the effect between major ethnicity and non-major ethnicity 
children is different in each country. The results from the experiment of secondary 
school students show that an increasing wage increases the possibility of the students 
to drop out and take the offered jobs. The students are less likely to take the jobs if the 
location is farther. Also, the findings show that the students who have a higher 
probability to take the jobs are non-Lao ethnicity students, come from poor household, 
have friends working outside of the Laongarm district, and have a difficulty travel to 
school. For the discrete choice experiment with teacher trainees, the results suggests 
that the potential teachers are less likely to take the teaching profession if they are 
assign to teach in school that locates in rural village without several support 
infrastructures and has poor condition of classroom. The potential teachers prefer the 
teaching profession over the non-teaching jobs such as the government staff, state-
enterprise employee, and private company employee. However, the preference of the 
non-teaching jobs easily exceeds the preference of the teaching job if the potential 
teachers need to teach in difficult situation. 
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Cambodia and Laos have adopted the international legislation relating to child 
labor such as the C138 of the International Labour Organization as shown in Table 
6.1. Cambodia implemented the C138 in 1999 and has categorized the light work 
provision and the list hazardous; while Laos established the C138 in 2005 and does 
not have the light work provision and the list of hazardous. Although both countries 
have the legislation relating to child labor, the results of this study suggest that there 
is still a chance of children to be out of school, either for work or not, relate to the 
growth of economic sectors suggest agriculture and service. 
 
 Table 6.1. Legislation Relating to Child Labor 
Country 
Establishment 
C138 
ratification 
Minimum 
age 
specified 
Light work provision Hazardous list 
Cambodia 1999 15 
Yes, from 12 years 
(MoSALVY, Prakas 
No.002 of 2008) 
Yes (MoSALVY, 
Prakas No.106 of 
2004) 
Laos 2005 14 No No 
Source: UCW, 2015. 
 
6.2. Policy implications 
 
This research provides four main policy implications for educational 
development which are: improving the regulation to stop child labor activities that 
prevent them from school, informing people knowledge of the risk to dropout from 
working, providing the education support program, and developing the teacher 
incentive scheme. The detailed discussion are below. 
 Firstly, children have a possibility to be out of school for working; thus, the 
government should be considered strengthen the regulations to prevent the use of child 
labor that causes them to be out of school, particularly compulsory education. 
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Secondary, households should also be educated about the important of the basic 
education and the risk to be out of school because of working. 
Thirdly, the particular programs to motivate school enrollment as well as 
keeping students in school should be considered where there is a high risk for children 
to be out of school. Also, different characteristics of students and households influence 
the decision of dropping out; then, the program should be allocated to particular 
households or children who have a possibility to be out of school. 
Fourthly, the difficulty in teaching profession such as the rural location and 
poor condition of classroom lowers the preference of potential teachers to join 
teaching profession; therefore, teachers in the particular location should be provided 
incentive programs. A particular difficulty in teaching profession should be addressed 
by a particular and appropriate incentive value. Finally, the government should be 
concerned using the indirect monetary incentives. 
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